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attention  to  the  largely Malay‐populated provinces of Southern Thailand. Since 
then, there has been a proliferation of published written works on the  issue  in 
the  form of newspaper  articles,  reports,  as well  as  scholarly writings.  Yet,  the 
issue remains  largely perplexing for observers of the political violence  including 
academic, public intellectuals, and the Thai‐government, amongst others. 
This  thesis attempts  to shed some  light on  the political  turmoil  through 
the  author’s  observation  of  the  everyday  lives  of Malays  living  in  the  area.  It 
contends  that Malay memories of  violence between  their  community  and  the 
Thai‐state  are  consequential  in  the  formation  of  its  contemporary  members’ 
attitudes towards the Thai‐state and  its agents such as the civil service and the 
security forces. 
The  Malay  community  of  southern  Thailand,  however,  must  not  be 
viewed as a monolithic group. While some amongst them take up arms and join 
the insurgency, many other do not. They resist the Thai‐state is other ways. 
Chapter  one  discusses  the  fear  that  grips  the  social  atmosphere  in 
Thailand’s  southernmost  provinces  of  Pattani,  Yala,  and Narathiwat.  It  argues 
that  fear  is  used  as  an  instrument  of  power  for  the  Thai‐state  as well  as  the 
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ESSENTIALISM AND THE MALAYS OF SOUTHERN 
THAILAND 
 
“What do you think? Can they find the solutions to this 
problem? I don’t think so. They can’t just come here for a few 
days each time and expect to find solutions. You, on the other 
hand, come here and stay in the village for months. You help 
the villagers with their work at sea; you do construction work 
with them; sit at the coffee-shop and talk to them. That’s the 
way it should be. But can you find the solution?” 
That was Khruu Jan’s1 response to me after I asked for his 
opinion on the prospects for the National Reconciliation 
Commission (NRC)2 finding solutions to the on-going violence 
that has wrecked the socio-political landscape of Thailand’s 
southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. I was 
gratified by Khruu Jan’s appreciation for my approach to 
research, but I responded to his final question with a “no”. 
                                                          
1 Khruu means “teacher” in Thai. Khruu Jan is a teacher in a primary school in Pattani. 
Although he original hails from another province in southern Thailand, Trang, he now calls 
Pattani his hometown; he has spent more than thirty years in Pattani as he was posted to the 
school immediately upon completing his training as a teacher.  
2 The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was set up in March 2005 under the 
initiative of Thailand’s Premier Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006). The commission was tasked 
with exploring possible solutions to southern Thailand’s social turmoil through consultation 
with the Malay community of southern Thailand. The commission was disbanded after 
submitting its report in June 2006.  
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Khruu Jan then added, “Many researchers come here and tell 
us that they want to do research. But, they are all the same. 
They stay for a week and then go back to Bangkok. Then, they 
come back six months later and repeat this. After that, they 
claim to have done research here for six months.” My foster 
brother3, Bang Ae, who was listening to our conversation 
nodded in agreement. 
Khruu Jan’s statement about researchers is perhaps too sweeping. 
Researchers are not a monolithic category of people. There are those who 
continue to conduct residential field research in the midst of daily violence in 
the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, in southern Thailand. The 
current wave of violence in the area began when an army camp in Narathiwat 
was raided by a group of unknown assailants. The raiders killed four soldiers 
before making off with more than one hundred assault rifles; meanwhile, 
seventeen schools and three police posts were burnt down simultaneously. 
(Bangkok Post 2004c) According to Bang Ae, in a telephone conversation the 
next day on 5 January 2004, some people blamed the attacks on bandits, 
while others predicted a return of armed separatist movements, which had 
begun to dissipate following the government’s granting of amnesty to 
                                                          
3 Abang angkat in Malay. I found out that my maternal ancestor originate from southern 
Thailand when I went through my late-grandfather’s journals in 2002; after visiting the area 
several times. On a subsequent visit, I whispered to myself saying that it would be pleasant 
to meet some of my own relatives in southern Thailand. Bang Ae and Bang Mat, another 
Malay man in his early forties, who had overheard my comment then offered to adopt me as 
a foster younger brother, adik angkat. The three of us have remained close since; they have 
since attended important events of my life such as my undergraduate graduation as well as 
my wedding ceremony. 
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insurgents in 1981. (McCargo 2007b) “Just when we thought that it (the 
separatist movements) was over and we can finally move on”, said Bang Ae 
who was anticipating the tough times that would follow the resumption of 
the insurgency. 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are the three southernmost provinces of 
Thailand that border with Malaysia. The majority who live here are Malay-
Muslims, a large number of whom identify with the historical Malay kingdom 
of Patani4 . The kingdom of Patani flourished in the area from early sixteenth 
century until 1786 when it was finally invaded by Siam, then ruled by Rama I, 
after several failed attempts by the latter. (Syukri 2005) Armed separatist 
activities in the area intensified in the 1970s when earlier peaceful demands 
for independence were not met. (A. Malek 1993) The authorities, however, 
appeared to have successfully established peace with the Malay population 
when there was a significant reduction in incidence of armed attacks on 
public officers in the 1990s. 
The then Defense Minister, General Thamarak Issarangura, sent the 
nation into frenzy when he claimed during a cabinet meeting that the 
insurgents aimed to take control of Narathiwat in 1000 days and would hoist 
their flag at Thaksin Rajanivej Palace to mark their success. (The Nation 2004) 
This did not happen, but the violent attacks such as drive-by shootings, 
bombings, and arsons, escalated and would soon become a daily event. 
                                                          
4 In this thesis, Pattani (spelt with 2 ‘t’s) shall refer to the province in present-day Thailand; 
Patani (spelt with a single ‘t’) shall then refer to the historical Malay kingdom. 
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Two violent clashes between Thailand’s security forces and members 
of the Malay community have generated much interest in the on-going 
political conflict in southern Thailand; the first incident took place on 28 April 
2004 while the second one on 25 October 2004. On 28 April 2004, militants 
attacked eleven security posts and checkpoints around provinces of Pattani, 
Yala, and Songkhla simultaneously. (Satha-Anand 2007) By the end of that 
day, more than one hundred of the militants, who were mostly armed with 
machetes and a few rifles, were killed in clashes that ensued between them 
and the Thai security forces at various locations. (Bangkok Post 2004b) This 
event attracted much attention and the government was criticized for the 
military’s extreme use of force; 32 militants who had taken refuge at the 
Pattani’s Krisek Mosque were allegedly shot at point-blank. (Bangkok Post 
2004a) 
The second incident took place on 25 October 2004. It began with 
more than one thousand Malay-Muslim protestors gathering outside a police 
station in the district of Tak Bai, Narathiwat. The crowd demanded the 
release of six village defense volunteers who were withheld on suspicion that 
they gave their weapons, which were issued by the government, to separatist 
militants. More than eighty of the demonstrators subsequently died as a 
result of the security personnel’s violent handling of the crowd; rifles were 
fired in the direction of the crowd, demonstrators who were caught by the 
security officers were stamped upon, and then they were stacked into army 
trucks and transported to various military camps in southern Thailand. Video 
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CDs of the events quickly circulated around Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. 
Video clips of the incident were also broadcasted on some international 
television channels. The death of more than seventy-five of those arrested 
due to suffocation while being transported to the military camps provoked 
much chastisement for the Thai government from various quarters including 
scholars, the media, and human rights organizations. (Tunyasiri 2004) 
Three and a half years have passed since the start of the on-going 
wave of violence in southern Thailand in January 2004. Several major changes 
have taken place in Thailand’s political arena such as the toppling of Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by a military coup in September 2006. The 
military has since appointed a civilian-led government headed by a retired 
general, Surayud Chulanont. Yet life has remained the same for many 
residents of southern Thailand. In a recent telephone conversation with Bang 
Ae, I asked him if the situation has improved. He responded by saying, “The 
situation remains the same; in fact, it may have gotten worse. I am not sure.” 
Khruu Jan’s earlier statement about researchers, although simplistic, 
is important nonetheless. During a visit to southern Thailand in June 2004, 
some Malays lamented about being overlooked by public figures such as 
academics, government officials, journalists, and public intellectuals, amongst 
others, in public discussions about the on-going violence. “As usual, nobody 
sees us. Nobody hears us. This is always the case in Thai society. The ‘small 
people’ are always neglected”, said Bang Ae. 
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There is some truth in Bang Ae’s statement.5  Most writings on the 
political conflict in southern Thailand that have been published since 2004 
tend to adopt a macro-perspective on the issues involved. (Gilquin 2005; 
McCargo 2007a; Yusuf and Schmidt 2006) The violence in southern Thailand 
is often seen as a problem that needs to be diagnosed so that a quick solution 
to the violence can be developed. Furthermore, the situation is often 
assessed from a scholarly perspective; very little attention is paid onto how 
the violence is being interpreted by individual members of the community in 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. 
Most works on the Malays of southern Thailand (A. Malek 1993; A. 
Malek 1994; Al-Fatani 1994; Fraser Jr. 1984; Gilquin 2005; Suwannathat-Pian 
1988; Syukri 2005; Teeuw and Wyatt 1970; Yusuf and Schmidt 2006) tend to 
essentialize them as a monolithic group; that is opposed to the Buddhist Thai 
nation-state. This is partly due to the macro-perspective approach 
undertaken when studying the community. Consequently, these writings 
about the relations between the Malay community and the Thai nation-state 
tend to classify their viewpoints in a binary-logic; their opinions tend to be 
represented as being in opposition to each other. For example, Sugunnasil 
                                                          
5 Actually there are writers who do pay attention to the “small people”. See, 
Janchitfah, Supara 
2007 A Tale of Towns in Fear. Bangkok Post, 29 July 2007. 
C. Pinyorat, Rungrawee 
2007b Thai Muslims Often the Victims in Fight between Muslim Radicals and Buddhist 
Rulers. Associated Press, 11 June 2007. 
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(2007: 113) states that Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand reject “the 
secular orientation of the Thai state, which is seen as incompatible with the 
region’s devoutly Muslim ways.” This is, then, argued to be one of the main 
factors that contribute to a growth in Islamic radicalism amongst them. 
Sugunnasil’s argument carries weight; however, he fails to show that Malay 
views on the Thai-state are varied. Some Malay-Muslims feel that the state 
allows adequate space for them to practice their religion.6  
In this thesis, I hope to show the varied attitudes and responses of the 
Malays7 of southern Thailand to issues of violence that have plagued their 
community primarily since 2004. Indeed, many Malays are influenced by the 
dominant discourse in their community; that the Thai-state has treated them 
cruelly. However, there are some amongst them who are more skeptical. 
They question these dominant perspectives, which usually originate amongst 
their community’s elites. Hence, it is argued that there is room for agency 
amongst members of the Malay community of southern Thailand despite the 
unequal power relations that they are subjected to. 
It is argued in this thesis that the resistance of the Malays in southern 
Thailand against the Thai nation-state takes on a multiplicity of forms. While 
some take part in armed anti-state resistance movements, others take the 
                                                          
6 This point will be elaborated in chapter three. 
7 My fieldwork was primarily conducted amongst the Malays. With the exception of a few 
ethnic-Thai friends with whom I played sepaktakraw regularly, it was generally difficult to 
conduct research amongst members of both the Malay and Thai communities. The on-going 
conflict has unfortunately created much tenseness between both communities. Thus, it 
would be difficult to earn the trust of one community if one is seen to be spending much 
time amongst the other. 
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Thai nation-state to task on other issues such as the production of the 
community’s history. 
In the first chapter, I argue that the socio-political landscape of the 
three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat is devastated by the on-
going violence. Many people in southern Thailand experience fear in their 
daily lives; in a large part, due to the constant threat of harm to their lives. 
This fear is both the result of, and the thrust for, the surveillance activities of 
the insurgents as well as the Thai-state. Although the threat of violence from 
the insurgents and the Thai-state through its security force seems to be 
omnipresent, many Malays exercise political agency by refusing to take sides 
with either side in the conflict. 
Chapter two is ethnography of violence and remembering. It is about 
the attempt of some Malays to memorialize their interpretations of violent 
episodes in their community’s relations with the Thai nation-state in recent 
years. More specifically, some Malays build graves in the form of monuments 
to buttress their community’s remembering of some of its members who 
were killed by various agents of the Thai-state such as its security forces. 
While these men would be viewed as trouble-makers by the Thai-state, these 
tombs commemorate them as heroes amongst the Malays. Yet the doubts of 
Bang Mat, a Malay, for the validity of the martyrdom that has been conferred 
on them by some members of the Malay community, including religious 
institutions, shows that some Malays question the credibility of the 
perspectives of not only the Thai-state, but also that of the Malay builders of 
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these tombs in regards to the slain individuals. Bang Mat’s views shows that 
not all Malays are easily consumed by the politics between their community 
and the rest of the Thai nation-state such that they uncritically acquiesce to 
the dominant political viewpoints of their community. 
Chapter three shows that varying conceptions of Thailand’s past 
influence politics in the nation-state’s contemporary society; it takes the 
discussion of memories of violence in chapter two into the context of 
national politics. For people who are solely exposed to, or are convinced by, 
Thailand’s nationalist history, the Malays of southern Thailand are easily 
viewed as perpetual dissidents who are disloyal to the institutions that many 
other Thai citizens treat with sacrality such as the nation-state, the 
monarchy, and Buddhism. Traditional Malay interpretations of their 
community’s past, however, claim that the Malays were subjugated by Siam8 
in 1786. Dominant Malay social memories of their relations with the Thai-
state after their defeat in 1786 are permeated by memories of the historical 
injustices of the Thai-state. Such memories, especially those of the sufferings 
of fellow Malays, create fertile grounds for Malay armed resistance 
movements to recruit members from within their ethnic community. 
However, many Malays do not support the insurgency; let alone join it. 
The history of humanity has been tarnished with too many instances 
of violence including wars, genocide, human massacres, and terrorism, 
                                                          
8 Thailand was formerly known as Siam. The name change took place in 1939. 
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amongst others. Many of these regrettable events such as the Khmer Rouge 
genocide in Cambodia as well as the massacre of the Jews by Germany in the 
Second World War are caused, in part, by the essentialist attitudes of some 
influential individuals or institutions in societies. Such attitudes when 
reinforced by an uncritical support of a substantial following are a potent 
brew for violence to transpire. 
The violence in southern Thailand can be explained, in part, by the 
existence of essentialist views of the Thai nation-state towards its Malay 
population in southern Thailand; the reverse is also true. This thesis adopts a 
more nuanced view of the Malays of southern Thailand by paying attention 
to the dominant, as well as alternative, views of the Thai nation-state 
amongst members of the Malay community. Likewise, some non-Malay 
members of Thai society do not subscribe uncritically to the view of the 
Malays as disloyal troublemakers. A discussion of the alternative views of 
these non-Malay members of Thai society is, however, beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
I do not claim to understand the violence in Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat more than others. However, I hope that this thesis shows the 
importance of recognizing the presence of agency amongst the Malays of 
southern Thailand; in order to combat the essentialist images others have 
about them; especially those of their fellow countrymen. Similarly, it is 
important to combat essentialism worldwide; such enterprise may just help 
humanity avoid the costly lessons, such as the unnecessary sacrifice of 
11 
 
human lives in events such as wars and genocide, from which many amongst 




VIOLENCE, FEAR, UNCERTAINTIES, AND POLITICS: 
SOUTHERN THAILAND IN A CLIMATE OF FEAR 
The weather was hot, as usual, that morning. I sat alone at a table in 
Mat Soh’s coffee-shop, sipped my coffee and watched Kampong Keli’s 
residents shop at the travelling market that came to the village every 
Wednesday. Chicken rice, sweet drinks, fruits, snacks, dishwashing 
detergents, brooms, and used clothes were some items that were on sale. 
A man stepped into the coffee-shop and heaved out a lungful of air. 
He called out an order for a glass of iced tea as he walked to join me at the 
table. I noticed him looking intently at my mobile phone as I held it up to read 
a text message that I had just received. Then, he asked me, “You are not from 
here?” I was taken aback. According to him Siemens-brand mobile phones 
are not popular amongst mobile phone users in southern Thailand. I took that 
as a cue to divulge my identity. The man looked skeptical even after I 
introduced myself as a Singaporean graduate student.  What is a Singaporean 
dressed in sarong and t-shirt doing in a village in the violence-plagued region 
of southern Thailand? Mat Soh interrupted our conversation to re-affirm my 
identity; that I was the leader of the two groups of students who came and 
build extensions to the village’s tadikah9 in 2002 and 2003.10 The man 
                                                          
9 Tadikah is a type of Islamic religious school that is usually run by members of respective 
villages. The schedule of operations varies from one tadikah to another. Most Muslims in the 
Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are introduced to the basic teachings of Islam 
at these schools. 
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introduced himself as Mat Ding. He told me that he had heard of our 
community-building projects.11 
I told Mat Ding that my stay this time was going to be a little different 
from the others. I was conducting field research and would be living in 
southern Thailand for six months. I explained to him that I was interested in 
studying the ways in which the Malay residents of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat coped with the daily violence that was devastating the social 
environment in these three provinces. 
Mat Ding’s face lit up as he began to show enthusiasm about my 
research. Many government officers, scholars, and journalists discuss the on-
going violence in public. Yet, Mat Ding thinks that many of them are oblivious 
to the everyday predicament of residents of the three provinces; when 
interest is shown, it usually concerns the perceived need to empower 
Buddhists communities with firearms to defend themselves against 
suspected Malay-Muslim militants. Mat Ding’s views are shared by many 
Malays, as I would find out during the course of my fieldwork. 12 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 I first visited southern Thailand in February 2002 to conduct preliminary assessments for 
the feasibility of locating a community service project involving undergraduates from the 
National University of Singapore. Subsequently, I returned to southern Thailand during every 
university term break for research, leisure, as well as community service. 
11 The travelling market used to be located at another site in the village. However, it has been 
relocated to the tadikah. The temporary stalls are now set-up on the concrete courtyard that 
was built during the second community service project. 
12 Since I started researching rural issues since 2002, I am often told of the indifference 
attitude with which the quotidian concerns of rural communities are treated. Even non-
governmental organizations, who claim to champion the rights and interests of the under-
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For Mat Ding, traveling along roads, especially the highways, had 
become considerably risky. His pickup truck’s tires have been punctured by 
metal spikes that were placed on the highways twice when he drove to 
deliver goods at night. These metal spikes are meant to puncture the tires of 
military vehicles as they travel to sites of insurgent attacks during the night. 
Mat Ding had, since, reduced the number of delivery jobs that he undertook 
and restricted all his commuting activities to the day. He said that he had to 
make those decisions even if they were detrimental to his family’s income. 
He would consider stopping all delivery jobs as well as peddling at the 
traveling market if the situation worsened.  Mat Ding excused himself half an 
hour into our conversation in order to pack the goods back onto his pickup 
truck as the market was closing for the day. 
The on-going violence in southern Thailand, which broke out in 
January 2004, has attracted considerable attention from various quarters; 
local and foreign governments, media, scholars, and terrorism studies 
institutes, amongst others. The violence is often viewed by many as a 
problem akin to an illness for which a panacea needs to be prescribed swiftly. 
The importance of seeking solutions to the violent cannot be denied. 
However, this enterprise must not be limited to the search for anti-state 
insurgents to find out the motivations behind their campaign and negotiate 
for an immediate cessation of their violent activities. Instead, attempts must 
                                                                                                                                                        




be made to comprehend the socio-political conditions of the community 
from which such anti-state Malay attitudes emerged. Doing so may not 
provide us with concrete solutions to the conflict; however, it enables us to 
locate the on-going violence within the context of relations between the 
Thai-state and the Malays of southern Thailand, which has been marred by 
conflicts that span several centuries.  
This chapter centers on the everyday lives and concerns of the Malay 
residents of the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in its 
violence-wrecked socio-political landscape. It suggests that many people in 
southern Thailand are living in a climate of fear. 
It will be argued that fear is instrumental in the political strategies 
employed by the perpetrators of violence. On the one hand, the Thai-state 
and the alleged insurgents, which are the more visible parties in the conflict, 
attempt to sway the Malay-Muslim population into supporting them by 
discrediting each other’s actions. On the other hand, both parties effect fear 
amongst the residents of southern Thailand through a combination of violent 
acts as well as the issuance of threats in order to deter present non-partisans 
in the violence from joining the enemy. This will explain, in part, for the 
reactions and ‘non-reaction’ of the Malays to the violence as well as to the 
Thai-state’s policies to solve it. 
Finally, this chapter argues that many Malays in southern Thailand 
resist the efforts of either party to dominate and govern their actions. This 
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chapter will, thus, provide a backdrop for the discussion of the Malays’ 
interpretations of the history of their community’s political relations with the 
Thai nation-state that disputes Thailand’s nation-building narrative. The 
preservation of such historical views by the Malays is partially subversive and 
is therefore will be taken as a form of non-violent resistance to a 
domineering Thai-state. 
Change in Atmosphere for Research in southern 
Thailand 
My conversation with Mat Ding at the coffee-shop confirmed several 
thoughts that I had in regards to the initial three weeks of my fieldwork. I 
spent most of that time helping my friends with crab-trapping at sea in the 
mornings and talking to them at the coffee-shop for the rest of the day. 
Basically, I was waiting; waiting to meet new people, waiting to hear the 
latest news of violent incidents, and waiting to visit other villages among 
others. The on-going violence had profound impacts on the social activities of 
the residents of southern Thailand, and has consequently made field research 
a knotty issue. 
It took two weeks before my friend Bang Tah from Kampong Ketam 
managed to secure the deal for me to rent a house in his village. Actually my 
foster brothers, Bang Ae and Ban Mat, had decided that they would persuade 
me into living with one of their families during the course of my fieldwork. 
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They felt that that would be the safer option as opposed to me living alone. I, 
on the other hand, felt uneasy at imposing on their families’ privacy.13 
Similarly, it was my relentless persuasion that drove Bang Tah to 
agree into introducing me to a trainer at a muay thai training camp that was 
located in the same sub-district14 as Kampong Ketam. I had first learnt muay 
thai from an eighty three year-old man from Kampong Keli in 2003 and had 
subsequently continued training with a martial arts school in Singapore. I felt, 
then, that joining a training camp in southern Thailand would enable me to 
meet new people who would also be potential informants for my research 
while I continue practicing the sport. 
Bang Ae and Bang Mat who were normally proactive in helping me 
out with my research activities since 2002 displayed changes in attitude. 
Since 2004, I have been warned not to discuss the issue of the on-going 
violence with strangers. Therefore, I was to rely on my closest friends and 
foster family such as Bang Ae, Bang Mat, Bang Tah, and Ayah Leh, to 
introduce me to others with whom it was deemed safe to discuss my 
research topic. Bang Ae and Bang Mat, however, constantly postponed the 
interviews that they promised to arrange. I did not want to be pushy 
although I was beginning to feel frustrated and anxious at the possibility of a 
futile fieldwork. 
                                                          
13 Furthermore, their houses were normally full. Amongst the Malays of southern Thailand, it 
is common for several generations of family members to live under one roof. 
14 Tambon in the Thai-language. 
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The reluctance of Bang Tah, Bang Ae, and Bang Mat, to introduce me 
to others, however, began to make sense, especially after my chanced 
meeting with Mat Ding at the coffee-shop. The violence in Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, has evoked much fear in residents of the region who, now, 
exercise more caution in their social activities. As was often said to me by 
others in southern Thailand, “You never know whom to trust.” For Mat Ding, 
even the brand name of my mobile phone was an indicator of my identity; 
that I was an outsider. Hence, it was reasonable that he would seek to 
ascertain my identity before talking to me. Fear has become central in the 
structuring of social activities in southern Thailand. 
Climate of Fear: Life in southern Thailand’s 
Violence-Wrecked Landscape 
Fear is such as unexceptional emotion; everyone experiences fear. 
According to Robin (2004: 27), “Fear is supposed to lurk beyond the reach of 
our rational faculties, a pre-natural invader waiting to breach the borders of 
civilization. It has no history.” Fear is experienced as we go about with our 
daily activities. 
Although fear may then be treated as part of the human condition, its 
intensity and impact can vary greatly. For people whose lives are surrounded 
by violence, like in southern Thailand, fear’s influence on people’s decision 
and behavior intensifies vis-à-vis other determinants of behavior. Mat Ding, 
for instance, is willing to stop his business operations if the threat of violence 
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heightens. Here, fear clearly poses a challenge to economic-pragmatism as 
Mat Ding deliberates his economic activities. 
Sadly, fear may also cause people to act in ways that are inconsistent 
with their own moral values. The following story, which Bang Ae related to 
me, illustrates this point. 
“It happened on my return after visiting you in Singapore in 
December 2004. I had just arrived. I was in a songthaew15, 
heading home towards Kampong Keli. We were still in Amphoe 
Muang16. The songthaew was moving slowly and then I heard 
someone shout for help. So, the driver stopped. I saw a 
woman pointing to a man who was unconscious after his 
motorcycle crashed into a gate along the side of road. As the 
driver and I helped him get off his motorcycle, I heard the 
woman wailing loudly. She said, ‘Serdadu17 Bang Mat has been 
shot! Serdadu Bang Mat has been shot!’ Only then did I realize 
that I was handling a murder victim in the on-going violence. 
After laying the dead policeman by the roadside, I turned to 
the driver, who is my friend from the neighboring village, and 
                                                          
15 The songthaew is a form of public transportation. In southern Thailand, It is usually a pick-
up truck that has a roof fitted into the rear portion. There are usually two or three benches 
placed for passengers to sit on. 
16 “Amphoe” means “district” and “muang” means “town” in the Thai-language. Therefore 
“amphoe muang” means “town-district”. 
17 Serdadu means police or policeman. So, Serdadu Bang Mat means a policeman who name 
is Bang Mat. 
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told him to get into his vehicle and we drove off. Afraid … 
(Bang Ae sighs and shakes his head) … Afraid.” 
Why did Bang Ae leave the site so hurriedly? “Afraid” was his answer 
when I posed him that question. Bang Ae feared that the killer may be 
observing the people at the scene and that if he was seen talking to the 
police when they arrive, the killer might think that Bang Ae was providing 
information to them. This, in turn, could result his own murder. As Bang Ae 
said, “I may be the next person lying on the road.” 
The violence and the resultant climate of fear have clearly altered 
people’s behavior. Many people know Bang Ae as a very helpful and civic-
minded person. Yet, he was ‘forced’ to leave the site of murder hurriedly for 
fear over his own safety. His decision is not considered unusual by others. 
Unfortunately, I was told by several others that they may not even stop to 
help if they come across an accident; especially, if they are unfamiliar with 
people in the area. 
Sources of Fear 
I have not witnessed any violent incident in southern Thailand during 
my visits there since the start of the crisis in January 2004; not even during 
my six-month fieldwork. There were, however, killings that took place in 
Kampong Ketam, the village in which I rented a house. My experience is not 
unique. Most of the people, whom I talked to, in southern Thailand have 
never witnessed the occurrence of violent incidents. 
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Green (1994: 230) noted that, “Fear is an elusive concept; yet you 
know it when it has you in its grips.” It is a reaction to perceived danger; fear 
grabs you when you feel vulnerable. For many people in southern Thailand, 
their social environment is full of symbols of danger; burnt buildings, 
shootings, and bombings; soldiers on beat, soldier-manned roadblocks, and 
even the sight of a convoy of military trucks passing through the village. I 
recall vividly that the sound of a helicopter hovering over my house during 
the graveyard hours used to make me feel anxious. 
What is happening? That seems to be a question that is planted in 
everyone’s head. For many Malay residents of southern Thailand, there are 
too many questions regarding the on-going violence that have not been 
convincingly answered. Who are the perpetrators? What are their motives? 
Who are they targeting? 
So far, none of the explanations that have been offered are 
considered acceptable. The most common view seems to be that the violence 
is being carried out by Muslim militants in pursuit of independence from 
Thailand for the Malays of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Some Malays ask, 
“Why are they killing fellow Malays then? Why are there more Malays than 
non-Malays who have been killed?” 
With so many questions left unanswered and the government still 
unable to get the situation under control, life in southern Thailand remains 
full of uncertainties. “Fear thrives on ambiguities.” (Green 1994: 227) 
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Rumors, anonymity of perpetrators, perceived random targeting of victims, 
and some dodgy policies of the government create and sustain people’s 
fears. 
Rumors 
One of the dilemmas that quickly confronted me when doing this 
research was related to the treatment of information. By the end of 2004, I 
have traveled many times to southern Thailand to conduct short periods of 
fieldwork. I was convinced that seeking the truth behind the causes of the 
violence was going to be an uphill task. 
Feldman (Robben and Nordstrom 1995: 233) notes that rumor 
“renames the field site for the ethnographer.” He posits that the 
ethnographer often encounters a situation where the “usual sources of facts, 
the channels and flows of information on which his or her work is dependent, 
are interrupted and broken up by political white noise.”(Robben and 
Nordstrom 1995: 233) It is further argued that the floating of rumors in 
ethnographic fields of violence indicates a “crises of facticity”. This was, in 
fact, the situation in southern Thailand. Simons (Robben and Nordstrom 
1995: 42-61) notes that rumors are often the only source of information for 
ethnographers studying violent conflicts. While the veracity of rumors is 
difficult to ascertain, rumors may still be instrumental in our efforts to 
understand the socio-political milieu in southern Thailand. 
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Leaflets18 that are distributed in public spaces are a prominent source 
of rumor. These leaflets, whose authors are usually anonymous19, often 
contain messages that discredit the Thai state as well as threats to those who 
are deemed to be state-collaborators20. Many of them are instructional; 
leaflets instructing people to stop working on Fridays stirred up much 
reaction during the course of my fieldwork. These leaflets, which began to be 
distributed in July 2005, initially advised shop-owners to stop operations 
every Friday in order to respect the “Islamic holy day” (Harai and Benjakaj 
2005). 
I recall vividly the time when Bang Ae told me about the leaflets as we 
changed into our exercise attire before heading out to play sepaktakraw21 
with other villagers at Kampong Keli. Sounding extremely worried, Bang Ae 
said, “Don’t know what’s going to happen. Now they say that people who 
open their shops on Fridays will have their ears cut off.” He let out a sigh, 
                                                          
18 Referred to as bai pliu in the Thai-language. 
19 Sometimes the leaflets are signed-off by entities such as “fighters of Patani” (Para Pejuang 
Patani) or Mujahideen Patani. Aside from several individuals who have been arrested on the 
suspicion of being authors or distributors of these leaflets, entities such as Para Pejuang 
Patani and Mujahideen Patani do not point to any particular individual. Thus, I consider such 
entities to be anonymous. 
20 Muslims who cooperate with the Thai state are labeled as munafiq, betrayers of Islam and 
the Malays of southern Thailand. 
21 Sepaktakraw is a sport that is played with a rattan ball that is approximately 6 inches in 
diameter. It is played between two teams of three akin to volleyball although only the feet 
and head are used for striking the ball. This sport is popular throughout Southeast Asia, 
especially Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. During fieldwork, I played sepaktakraw with 
the villagers of Kampong Keli regularly. Our conversations in between games were a great 
source of information for my research amongst other topics that were discussed. 
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shook his head, and continued, “They make it difficult for villagers such as 
market vendors. How are these people going to survive?” 
I sat and chatted with some friends at a coffee-shop that night. As 
usual, they interpreted the issue in various ways. Some said that it was 
probably a good idea to stop working on Fridays; it would allow fishermen 
and rubber-tappers, who otherwise work every day, to spend some quality 
time with their families. Such is the reaction of some people who remain 
optimistic in terrifying and depressing times. Some of them, however, 
eventually admitted that such developments in the violence are economically 
detrimental to them. 
The next day, 29 July 2005, Bang Ae and I rode our motorcycles to see 
if the Friday vendors at the district market would accede to the instructions 
specified in the leaflets. And so it was, we rode along empty streets; the fresh 
market was closed and the atmosphere was eerie. This situation continues to 
the present-day, although a few scattered shops in the three provinces have 
resumed operations on Friday. Even official statements made by the Yala 
Islamic Committee explaining that Islam does not forbid its faithful from 
working on Friday have not been able to reverse the situation. (Harai and 
Benjakaj 2005) Visits by the former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, to 
build the confidence of the community on the issue have also failed. 
(Nanuam and Benjakaj 2005) Bang Ae’s reaction is telling when he said, “It’s 
easy for him to say. When he comes here, he is protected by so many 
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soldiers. After a day or two, he goes back to Bangkok. But we live here. Who 
will protect us?” 
The Puzzle over the Identities of Perpetrators of Violence 
Like the authors and distributors of leaflets, many perpetrators of 
violence in southern Thailand remain anonymous. Very few amongst the 
suspects arrested since the outbreak of the violence in January 2004 have 
been charged and subsequently proven guilty. Meanwhile, violent incidents 
such as drive-by shootings and bomb explosions remain almost a daily 
occurrence. Security forces have little control over the situation. Soldiers and 
police officers are sometimes seen as sitting ducks despite donning bullet-
proof vests and carrying firearms. According to some people, the uniforms 
and equipments of the security officers make them more conspicuous and 
thus easy targets. 
The Malays of southern Thailand are often chastised other members 
of Thai society for not cooperating with the government and its security 
forces in efforts to identify and arrest the perpetrators. The identities of the 
perpetrators may indeed be known to residents of the particular areas where 
they come from. However, the decision by these residents not to reveal the 
identities of perpetrators is not ungrounded. On the other hand, it is also 
highly probable that many people in the region are unfamiliar with the 
identities of the perpetrators. According to Bang Ae, “It’s alright when we are 
in our own village. We know one another. But when we go to another village, 
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we don’t know. The locals will know their neighbors, but we don’t. Thus, we 
don’t know who carries out violent attacks outside of our own village.” 
Many villagers feel unsafe while traveling outside their villages. 
Several people told me that they feel anxious when other motorcycles, 
especially those with pillion, approach to overtake them. It is often perceived 
that drive-by assassins work in pairs; one person concentrates on riding the 
motorcycle while the other acts as a sniper. On many occasions, security 
officers who sit on the rear carriage of patrol pick-up trucks would stare at 
me as I overtake them; especially if I am riding with another person. 
Someone told me that he had a rifle quickly pointed at him by a soldier once 
when he reached into his pocket to answer a call on his mobile phone while 
his friend, the rider, was overtaking a patrol vehicle. He raised his arms to 
show me that the hair on his arms was standing as he still gets the creeps 
whenever he reflects on the experience. 
My friends and I sat down at a coffee-shop beside Bang Ae’s house as 
we waited for the prayer call at dusk from Kampong Keli’s historic mosque 
one evening. We watched and listened intently as the daily report on the 
violence was read on the news. One of my friends, then, exclaimed that one 
of the victims was murdered by soldiers. I asked him to explain as I have 
heard such allegations been made by several others. He claimed that he 
contacted his friend who lives in the area after receiving a text message 
carrying the details of the geographical location of the incident through the 
mobile phone network operator news update service.  According to his 
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friend, some villagers observed that soldiers have been loitering near the 
victim’s house for several days; hence, they believe that the murder was the 
work of soldiers. So fast the way rumors spread. 
Bang Mat concurred by saying that many people discerned a pattern 
in the sequence of events building-up to some violent incidents. According to 
some villagers, the sight of soldiers loitering close to one’s house spells 
trouble. When some soldiers stationed themselves in front of my house in 
Kampong Ketam in the mornings in order to ‘provide security coverage’ to 
students and teachers of a nearby pondok22, my neighbors insisted that it 
would be expedient for me to stay in Kampong Keli for a few days. I acceded 
to their advice. Nothing violent happened eventually. The soldiers stopped 
their operations after three days. 
Some Malays reckon the possibility of government-linked agencies 
such as the police and the military involvement as perpetrators of the 
violence. Distrust for the state and its security apparatuses runs deep 
amongst many Malays of southern Thailand. There have been instances of 
villagers placing physical obstacles as well as human barricades to obstruct 
security personnel from entering their villages to conduct investigation of 
murders. One such incident took place at Ban Lahan following the murder of 
a Muslim cleric in September 2005. (Ruangdit 2005) A similar blockade was 
also staged at Ban Tanjong Limo, in the same province, following the 
                                                          
22 Pondok is a type of full-time residential Islamic religious school. 
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butchering of two marines who were clobbered to death after being taken 
hostage by the villagers. (Pathan and Ganjanakhundee 2005) These human 
barricades bespeak of the villagers’ distrust for the state and its security 
forces. (Pathan and Ganjanakhundee 2005) The two marines were originally 
meant to be used as a bargaining tool for the villagers to demand that the 
government investigate into a fatal shooting incident in the village that 
occurred earlier that week. 
Everyone is at Risk: the Need to Exercise Extra Caution 
Che Su, Bang Ae’s father-in-law, is a man of quiet disposition.23 
Interaction between us comprised mostly of polite smiles and occasional 
pithy conversations. In the morning before I moved into my rented home at 
Kampong Ketam, Che Su approached me and smiled before sitting on the 
wooden floor of his stilted house and watched me pack my belongings into 
my haversack. From the awkwardness of his body-language, I sensed that he 
had something to tell me. So, I started a conversation by commenting on the 
tediousness of packing. Che Su acknowledged my comment with the usual 
smile. Then, in a concern voice he asked if I was sure about my decision to 
move to Kampong Ketam. He said that I was always welcomed in his home. I 
told him that it would be better to my research if I talked to more people 
than just residents of Kampong Keli. Che Su acquiesced although my decision 
                                                          
23 Che Su’s face is tanned and wrinkled. It tells the story of a fisherman who has endured 
years of hardship working in the scorching sun. His life is a real success story to many 
residents of Kampong Keli. Two of his five children have earned their degrees. One of them 
went on to complete a Master degree, while the other is employed in the civil service a 
district officer. In southern Thailand, like in many rural provinces in Thailand, a career in the 
civil service is respectable and therefore highly sought after. 
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still bothered him. He, then, offered advice, “Try not to go out at night. Don’t 
sit by the roadside. (I’m) worried that they mistake you for someone else and 
shoot you.” I nodded in appreciation of his advice. 
Che Su’s words illustrate the fear that many people have of becoming 
accidental casualties of the violence. Many people say that it is better to 
exercise extra care lest one risks being caught at the “wrong place” and at the 
“wrong time”. Some of them, however, would sigh and tell me, “(I) don’t 
know when I’ll die. If it’s fated, then I can’t avoid it”. 
Fear escalates when it is perceived that targets of violence are 
selected randomly. (Turk 1982) Various people in southern Thailand told me 
that although violence and insurgency are not new to the area, it was safer in 
the past. Many people told me that insurgent movements used to target only 
government-related people and institutions. This has changed since January 
2004. Human casualties include both government and non-government 
related persons and organizations including civilian bureaucrats, security 
officers, teachers, religious leaders, plantation workers, ordinary civilians, 
and businesses amongst others. People are being killed regardless of their 
ethnicity, religion, gender, and age. This situation is particularly traumatic for 
many people as it is quite commonly believed that anyone may be targeted. 
The Distressing Policies of the Thai-state 
Some policies introduced by the state to manage the situation in 
southern Thailand exacerbate the climate of fear. The practice of compiling a 
top-secret blacklist was often mentioned in conversations. Generally, many 
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people were skeptical of the state’s intelligence-gathering methods. Islamic 
religious teachers were notably worried. Islamic religious schools are often 
accused of being nests for the nurturing of insurgent elements. Bang Mat, 
who is the headmaster of Kampong Keli’s tadikah, has been interviewed 
several times by the military as well as the district office on several occasions. 
A villager at Kampong Ketam once told me that he refused to allow his son, 
who is studying at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, to return to Thailand until the 
violence is over. Like many other parents whose children are enrolled in 
Middle Eastern universities, he is worried that his son may be arbitrarily 
placed on the blacklist. 
The confidence that many people in southern Thailand have in the 
Thai-state is tenuous. The acquittals of suspected insurgents in court reduce 
their trust further. On 3 June 2005, four men, including a medical doctor 
named Waemahadi Wae-dao, were released on bail after being detained for 
two years during their trial. (The Nation 2005b) All four were eventually 
acquitted from the charge that they were members of the regional terrorist 
organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). (The Nation 2005a) Waemahadi Wae-dao 
said, “… State officials should use my case as a precedent and a lesson for 
arresting others. They should have sufficient evidence before prosecuting 
someone.” (The Nation 2005b) In light of such fiascos, many people remain 
doubtful of the Thai-state’s ability to manage the situation. 
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Political Fear and Discipline: Using Fear as a Vehicle of 
Power 
For many residents of southern Thailand, like the Xe’caj of Guatemala 
who community was caught in the midst of several decades of violence, “Fear 
is the reality in which people live, the hidden state of (individual and social) 
emergency that is factored into the choices women and men make.” (Green 
1994: 228) Fear “arouse a heightened state of experience” (Robin 2004: 4) 
through which people are sensitized, or perhaps over-sensitized, to perceive 
potential dangers that surround them. The situation, then, renders people 
more vulnerable to political manipulation; as “fear is an apprehension of 
harm, and because harm is the deprivation of some good to the individual, 
wielders of power can arouse fear merely by threatening the individual’s 
enjoyment of that good” (Robin 2004: 19);  a peaceful life in the case of the 
residents of southern Thailand. Thus, fear may be utilized as a potent vehicle 
of power for both political elites as well as retractors who stand to profit 
from it. (Robin 2004) 
The use of fear as a vehicle for political domination is not a recent 
trend. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1995) begins with the public torture 
of Damiens in France in 1717 for alleged regicide. Damiens’s public torture 
and subsequent execution is an example of the use of violence on a political 
dissenter with the purpose of punishing him for his crime as well as to deter 
other potential dissidents through effecting fear. 
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In southern Thailand today, the use of fear as a vehicle for power is 
commonplace. The conspicuous presence of security officers combined with 
mounting distrust for them and the Thai-state heightens many people’s fear. 
Bang Ae, for instance, always try to avoid roadblocks with the reason that “it 
is troublesome”. Eventually, Bang Ae divulged that his avoidance of 
roadblocks is motivated by his fear for uniformed officers. His fear is, 
however, not baseless. Many people in southern Thailand have seen the 
intensity of violence that security personnel are capable of; such as the 
security forces’ response to attacks by Malay militants on 28 April 2004. 
On that day, several groups of lightly-armed militants attacked several 
security checkpoints in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Of the events that led 
to a total of 113 fatalities, the clash between the militants and security force 
at the historic Krisek Mosque received the most interest. 
Several militants attacked a security post that was adjacent to the 
Krisek Mosque in the early hours of the day. In retaliation, security officers 
surrounded the mosque after the group of lightly-armed militants, retreated 
into it to seek refuge. After a nine-hour stand-off, soldiers stormed the 
mosque. The ensuing carnage saw the employment of machine guns, 
grenades, and rockets by the military on thirty-two militants who were 
mostly armed with machetes, with the exception a few guns. All the militants 
were killed; some at point-blank. 
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More than one hundred militants were killed in similar clashes that 
occurred simultaneously between security forces and militants on 28 April 
2004. Their corpses were lined-up by the roadside at the various sites of 
violence akin to a public display. 
 I received a telephone call from Bang Ae immediately after the events 
of Krisek ended. According to him many of his fellow villagers hurried to the 
beach when they heard gun-fires coming from the direction of Krisek. Tears 
rolled as they anticipated the terrifying news. Several individuals whom I met 
alleged that the massacres of the militants, especially at Krisek, were done 
purposefully by the government and the military. They contended that these 
events were meant to serve as examples for others. The corpses of the 
militant that were displayed embodied the threat to anyone harboring anti-
state intentions. In fact, many Malays of southern Thailand argue that the 
militants involved in the Krisek incident would eventually be forced to 
surrender if the security personnel simply continued to cordon the mosque 
and employ non-fatal tactics. 
The impact of the events brings to mind Foucault’s (1995) discussion 
of public torture. The spectacle of public tortures or the use of violence to 
punish perceived enemies of the state is not directed solely at the alleged 
criminal. These events may, in fact, be seen as the state’s warnings to its 
subjects. The fear that is evoked from the subjects may then be used to 
coerce them into compliance and even cooperating with the state; in other 
words, to “discipline” them. (Foucault 1995) Such results are, however, not 
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always achieved. If the punishment is deemed unjust by the subjects, the 
state’s performance of power may backfire. (Foucault 1995) Many Malays 
count among those who are enraged by the state’s disproportionate use of 
force; hence, intensifying the unfavorable relations between the Thai-state 
and its Malay subjects in the southern region and contributing to their 
reluctance to cooperate with the Thai-state’s campaign to solve the violence. 
“Panopticism” of the Thai-State and the Insurgents 
 “Can they guarantee our safety? What will happen to our families if 
we are killed? The police and soldiers can’t even protect themselves! They 
are also scared!” said Bang Tah in response to my question. I had earlier 
asked Bang Tah for the reasons behind the reluctance of many Malays to 
volunteer violence-related information to the authorities. 
Many people in southern Thailand maintain a low-profile to avoid 
being seen as having any political-inclination; neither supporting the causes 
of the insurgents nor the Thai-state. They believe that it may be dangerous, 
even fatal, to be seen as a supporter or collaborator of either party in the 
conflict. 
While conducting fieldwork in 2005, I observed that the on-going 
violence was hardly, if ever, discussed openly in public. At the various coffee-
shops in Kampong Keli, the men24 would only discuss the issue in their small 
                                                          
24 Coffee-shops are frequented only by men. Women normally gather in their friends’ homes. 
My wife, who has visited Kampong Keli several times, felt intimidated by the overwhelming 




groups of trusted friends. Then, Bang Mat and Bang Ae would remind me 
regularly to speak softly when talking about the violence. The situation has 
worsened since then. According to Bang Ae, “Now it’s better not to say 
anything in public. For example, when news of the death of khruu Juling25 
was broadcasted on television, someone at the coffee-shop expressed pity 
for her. Someone else then asked forcefully, ‘Have you lived long enough?’” 
said Bang Ae during a visit to Singapore in 2007. Thus, similar to Tambiah’s 
(1996) observation of the violence in Sri Lanka, the violence in southern 
Thailand has become routinized and developed its own semiotic logic. The 
threats, leaflets, killings, bombings, and obvious presence of uniformed 
officers have taught the residents of southern Thailand to remain ‘docile’. 
The message is clear; do not cooperate with the other side lest risk being 
harmed. 
“You never know who is watching”, continued Bang Ae. Insurgents as 
well as the Thai-state have successfully used violence as well as threats of 
violence to create a “panoptic” environment. The use of civilians for 
surveillance has engendered a perception amongst many residents that the 
insurgents as well as the Thai-state are omnipresent.  
“We can’t even trust our own neighbors. The government offers 
rewards for anyone who provides credible information. But, what is 
                                                          
25Khruu Juling Pongkunmul died on 8 January 2007. Juling had been in a state for coma for 
eight months after an angry mob of villagers in Narathiwat clubbed her in a school hostage 




‘credible’? How do we know that they won’t twist the facts because they 
need a scapegoat?” – Bang Tah 
Thus, the use of civilians to conduct surveillance has theoretically 
surpassed the efficiency of Bentham’s Panopticon. (Foucault 1995) In the 
Panopticon, a vertical surveillance relationship is established between the 
inmates and the jailor. In southern Thailand, a horizontal surveillance 
relationship involving civilians is used to enhance vertical surveillance 
activities by both the insurgents as well as the Thai-state. 
The Non-Passivity of the Non-Partisans 
Despite the daily occurrence of violence in Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, the physical landscape does little to evince that the area is 
indeed marred by protracted violence. Aside from several vandalized 
signboards and burnt buildings that are sporadically located, the ubiquitous 
presence of uniformed security personnel is perhaps the most visible hint of 
the violence. 
If many people are indeed living in a state of fear, why do the physical 
and social landscapes appear normal? Perhaps for many people, the violence 
manifests only in the form of news that is broadcasted daily on television. 
Bang Ae was quick to respond when I suggested this to him. He warned me 
not to let the calmness mislead me. He added’ “I cannot speak for everyone, 
but many people choose not to think too much about it (the violence). We 
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need to defend our way of life, our livelihood. How do you cope with the 
violence? Aren’t you afraid?” 
Bang Ae’s question surprised me initially, but I could relate well to it. 
People often asked me if I was afraid in doing research in southern Thailand. I 
often responded by saying that I try not to think too much about the violence 
lest I will not be able to conduct my research. Perhaps I was foolish. Or 
perhaps one requires a different logic in order to cope with violence. 
“Although we feel wedged between the insurgents and the government, we 
cannot let them take full control over our lives”, said Bang Ae. 
Bang Ae’s words were enlightening. They cast the non-insurgent 
residents of southern Thailand in a different light; although they are non-
partisans in the violence, they are not politically passive. Indeed, they 
exercise agency in their political lives. Sometimes their positions are clearly 
discernable.  The thrashing of Thaksin’s incumbent Thai Rak Thai party during 
the general elections of February 2005 is an example. A record voter-turnout 
in the three provinces and the failure of Thaksin’s party to capture even a 
single seat allocated to Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in the House of 
Representatives evinces the residents’ dislike for Thaksin and his party. The 
refusal of the majority of the residents of these three provinces to vote for 
the election candidates from Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party is an expression of 
the their disdain for Thaksin’s management, or mismanagement, of the 
violence in southern Thailand. 
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At other times, the positions of the residents in regards to the 
insurgent-state conflict are less explicit. Many people’s views of the 
insurgents as well as the Thai-state are volatile. Events such as the clashes 
between Thailand’s security force and militants on 28 April 2004 as well as 
the security force’s violent handling of demonstrators at Tak Bai on 25 
October 2004 affect many people’s views rather significantly. During these 
events, the security force, and therefore the Thai-state, was thought to have 
employed disproportionate force on the militants and the demonstrators; 
thus, appearing cruel in the minds of many residents of southern Thailand. 
Consequently, “Some people began to think that perhaps it would indeed be 
better if we gain independence”, said Bang Ae. However, it is important for 
us not to rush into concluding that the Malays of southern Thailand harbor 
anti-Thai nationalistic intentions. According to Bang Ae, such reactions 
emerge in the “anger of the moment.” He claims that the attitude of the 
Malays towards the insurgents and the Thai-state changes in response to the 
actions of either side in the events that unfold in the on-going violence. 
Events such as those of 28 April and 25 October 2004 are not the only 
source of influence on people’s views of the conflict. The quotidian 
experiences in people’s lives, especially since the start of the violence, make 
the process of identifying with either conflicting side more complex. The 
collapse of the economy in the Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat is often blamed 
on the insurgents. Many people told me that the on-going violence has 
discouraged outsiders for doing business with them. Many residents of 
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Kampong Keli who are producers of fish crackers claim that many 
businessmen are afraid of dispatching their pick-up trucks to collect the fish 
crackers. Hence, with no means to transport their produce, the village 
economy is in a dire state. During a visit to Singapore in 2007, Bang Ae told 
me, “Many people say that they are angry towards the insurgents. What they 
are doing is hurting us badly.” 
Although wavering in their attitudes towards the Thai-state and the 
insurgents, many residents of southern Thailand seem fixed on maintaining a 
‘third position’ in the conflict; neither giving full support to the state nor the 
insurgents. Many of them who are committed to this position hope for a 
quick halt to the violence. The cessation to all the violence, in turn, should be 
achieved through peaceful means. People often told me that they are most 
saddened by the lost of many lives; alleged insurgents, state-linked persons 
such as security officers and civil servants, especially teachers, and most 
importantly innocent by-standers in the conflict. Nevertheless, it is possible 
for one’s attitude towards either side in the conflict to change, especially 
when one’s family members have become victims of the violence. During 
fieldwork, I followed Ayah Leh, who considers himself a “peace-advocate”, on 
his visits to several communities. He often spoke of the need to remain firm 
in their commitment to the use of peace-building approaches to end the 
violence. During a visit to southern Thailand in May 2007, it appears to me 
that many people remain committed to the third position. However, many 
residents of Kampong Keli seem enervated by the protracted violence that 
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has impacted their lives in significantly negative ways. There was a lot of 
disappointment and hopelessness in Bang Mat’s voice when he asked me, 
“How do you think this conflict can be put to an end? The scholar community 
keep saying santhi26 this, santhi that, but what do all these terms mean for 
our lives? We are still no nearer towards finding an end to the conflict then 
we were in 2004. In fact, we may be farther away now.” 
Conclusion: The Incessant Resistance of the Malays 
Since the re-emergence of widespread violence in southern Thailand 
in 2004, the social environment in the region has degenerated into one that 
can be characterized as a climate of fear. This chapter has argued that the 
insurgents and the Thai-state combine the use of violence and threats as a 
mode of conducting politics; especially for the government of people’s 
actions. Fear is materialized through practices such as surveillance, bombings, 
as well as news reports and everyday gossip. Surveillance, when conducted 
with the cooperation of civilians, intensifies people’s fears and, in turn, 
creates a panoptic social environment. 
Many residents of the three provinces that are engulfed by the 
violence, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, resist the Thai-state and the 
insurgents by not completely complying with the demands of either side. 
Their non-action in this respect evinces that many, if not most, people of 
southern Thailand are not politically passive. They exercise political agency 
                                                          
26 santhi is usually used as part of words that indicates peace; for example, santhiphaap 
(peace) and santhiwithii (peaceful means). 
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through their resilient commitment to the pursuit of peaceful approaches to 
end the violence. It has been shown that Malay resistance to the Thai-state is 
not limited to armed nationalist movements as in the case of the insurgents.  
Much can be learnt about the longstanding conflict between the Thai-state 
and the Malays of southern Thailand if we are not fixated on the spectacle of 




HEROES, REBELS, OR VICTIMS: “TOMBS OF 
MARTYRS” AND MALAY MEMORIES OF VIOLENCE 
 
The weather was hot and the sky was clear and blue; rather unusual 
in the month of December in southern Thailand. With the northeast 
monsoon hitting the eastern coast, rainfall and even storms would be more 
commonplace in this part of Thailand during this time of year. 
Bang Tah, myself, and several other friends were sitting in the rear-
portion of a pick-up truck; the sun’s heat stinging our skins. We were making 
way to the Provincial Islamic Committee of Pattani’s complex where a 
discussion organized by “Midnight University”27 involving some residents of 
southern Thailand and non-governmental activists from various provinces 
across the country. I was particularly attracted by the possibility of meeting 
Nidhi Aeusrivongse, a noted Thai historian, who was scheduled to be at the 
event. 
Bang Tah and I talked casually, engaged in banters, and shared 
complains about the hot and humid weather. It’s funny how people always 
complain about the weather even after they have experienced the same 
climate for almost all of their lives. Suddenly Bang Tah’s facial expression 
                                                          
27 Midnight University is an Internet-based forum [http://www.midnightuniv.org/] where 
social and political issues about Thai society are discussed. It regularly attracts academics and 
public intellectuals who contribute think-pieces that encourage critical analysis of social 
issues amongst the website’s visitors.  
43 
 
changed and he began speaking in a serious tone. He asked if I had ever 
visited Kubo Tok Ayah28. When I told him that I had not, Bang Tah pointed out 
that we had just gone past that cemetery. He then advised me to visit Kubo 
Tok Ayah where I will be able to see physical attestations of what he called, 
“Siamese cruelty” 29. His suggestion was timely as I wanted to identify 
objects, buildings, or symbols that possess historical significance to Malays of 
that region during that trip. 
Nine out of the thirty-two Muslim fatal casualties of the armed clash 
at Krisek Mosque on 28 April 2004 are buried at Kubo Tok Ayah. Their 
identities are not clear, except for one whose family had earlier intended to 
bury him in another cemetery in the town-district of Pattani, but changed 
their decision at the persuasion of the Provincial Islamic Committee of 
Pattani. I heard rumors that only two of the bodies were, in fact, 
unidentifiable; as for the others, their families were too afraid to claim their 
bodies as the then Prime Minister Thaksin had ordered that the families of 
the 106 Muslim casualties be investigated. 
An argument ensued when the military tried to spray water in order 
to wash the unclaimed bodies. The Provincial Islamic Committee of Pattani 
asserted that the victims were shuhada, or Islamic martyrs, as they had 
launched a jihad. Col Yodchai Yangyuen, commander of the Pattani army 
                                                          
28 Kubo is the Malay word for cemetery. Tok Ayah is a term of reference for a person whom 
the Malay community views with esteem. Tok Ayah as it is used in the name of this 
cemetery, however, refers to a particular person whose grave is located in that cemetery. 
29 The exact phrase used by some Malays is “Kezolimae Oghe Siye” 
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jurisdiction, initially refused to accede to the request of the Provincial Islamic 
Committee of Pattani, but eventually backed down after an hour of 
negotiations. (Nanuam 2004) 
Due to time constraints, I did not visit Kubo Tok Ayah during that visit 
in December 2004. Instead I returned in February 2005 eager to undertake a 
study of “tombs of martyrs”30 that can be found in southern Thailand. 
This chapter discusses the tombs of martyrs of the Malay community 
of southern Thailand. These tombs are built as monuments by some 
members of the Malay community in order to promote a remembrance of 
the individuals who lay buried in them as heroes; heroes of the Malay 
community who were cruelly killed by agents of the Thai-state. Due to the 
message that these tombs communicate, which is detrimental to the 
interests of the Thai nation-state, these tombs remain publicly inconspicuous. 
However, the personal recounting of events that are associated with these 
tombs show that these tombs are quite effective in achieving this aim, as 
many Malays, although not everyone, subscribe to their narratives. The 
previous chapter established that many Malays resist complete domination 
over their lives by insurgents as well as the Thai-state by refusing to side with 
either party in the on-going conflict. This chapter’s discussion shows how 
                                                          
30 Makam Shuhada as it is referred to in the Malay-language. This is the term that is 
commonly used by many Malays in southern Thailand to refer to the type of graves that are 
discussed in this chapter. 
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some Malays are able to resist the over-bearing Thai nation-state by building 
monumental cemeteries that oppose official notions of certain past events. 
Kubo Tok Ayah: A Platform for the Production of 
Malay Memories of Violence 
Upon entering the grounds of Kubo Tok Ayah, one is immediately 
greeted with a sea of gravestones. Several concrete-gated sections located 
on the left-hand side of the main footpath are an exception. I immediately 
guessed that the graves found within these gated sections belong to that of 
the former Malay aristocratic families, as was the practice in various 
cemeteries around southern Thailand.31 Furthermore, Kubo Tok Ayah is 
located approximately two hundred meters from a palace that was built by a 
Siam-appointed ruler of the province in the mid-nineteenth century.32 
As I walked towards the gated compounds, another grave on the 
right-hand side of the footpath caught my attention. Nonetheless, I followed 
the lead of Ayah Leh, Bang Ae, and Bang Mat, who were all walking towards 
the entrance of the gated sections. After saying some prayers dedicated to 
the former rulers, I asked Ayah Leh about the grave that had earlier caught 
                                                          
31 For explanations pertaining to physical structures and cultural practices associated with 
Muslim graves in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat see: 
Bougas, Wayne A. 
1988 Islamic Cemeteries in Patani. Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Historical Society. 
32 Siam’s army successfully invaded the historical Malay kingdom of Patani in 1786. After a 
series of two uprisings led by Malay-rulers who were appointed to the throne by Siam, it 
decided to divide Patani into seven provinces. The palace at Cabang Tiga was built by the 
ruler of Patani, which was by then just one of the seven provinces. 
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my attention. Why was it constructed differently from other graves that are 
found outside the gated sections? Ayah Leh’s face lit-up as he smiled and told 
me that that was the grave that he really intended to show me during that 
visit. 
Makam Shuhada Trajedi Pada Hari 13 Tanwakhom 2518: 
Tombs of the Martyrs of the Tragedy of 13 December 1975 
 
Picture of Makam Shuhada 75 
 
Close-up of Matching Set of Four Grave Markers at Makam Shuhada 75 
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First and foremost, the “Makam Shuhada Trajedi Pada Hari 13 
Tanwakhom 251833” or “Tomb of Martyrs of the Tragedy of 13 December 
1975” (hereafter Makam Shuhada 75) stands out from other graves in the 
compound of Kubo Tok Ayah because of its physical attributes. Like other 
Muslim cemeteries in southern Thailand, almost all the graves of non-
aristocrats are marked by only two gravestones: one marks the position of 
the head and the other the foot; the two gravestones, and therefore the 
bodies, are aligned in the direction of the Kaaba. Makam Shuhada 75, unlike 
other graves, is raised. This design characteristic, which is usually reserved for 
aristocrats, is an indication of the social importance of the buried persons. 
Other physical attributes of this tomb makes this point even clearer. Four 
pairs of red-painted tombstones are neatly arranged on top of the raised 
platform. A gate is also erected around the tomb using short pillars that are 
connected by chains. Even from afar, the contrasting red and green paints 
used on the tomb easily attract the attention of the visitor’s eyes. 
Some information is painted on one of the walls of the tomb. The 
information is provided in two languages; Thai as well as Malay, which is 
written in the Arabic-Jawi script34. The information given on the signboard 
                                                          
33 2518 on the Thai-Buddhist calendar is equivalent to 1975 on the Gregorian calendar. 
34 The Arabic-Jawi script was the de facto writing script of the Malay-language prior to the 
use of the Roman alphabet. Malays of southern Thailand continue to write, almost solely, in 
the Jawi script whereas most other practitioners of the Malay-language have switched to the 
Roman alphabet after it was selected to be the official script by the Third Malay Language 
Congress in 1956. See: 
Hussain, Abdullah, Nik Safiah Karim, and ASAS 50 
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state that eleven persons died during an unfortunate event that occurred on 
13 December 1975. The names of those who died are listed in both 
languages. 
 
Information in Thai-language 
In the Thai-language the name list starts with a heading that reads 
“Name List of Fallen Warriors during 13 December 2518 at 1940 Hours”. The 
final sentence in Thai-language states that the tomb was built in January 
1976. The information provided serves several purposes: firstly, it informs 
visitors of the identities of persons who are buried in the tomb; secondly, it 
may spark interest amongst visitors who are ignorant of events of December 
1975 to seek more information; thirdly, the information is meant to advocate 
a certain way of remembering the events of December 1975 as a tragedy, 
especially by those who are already conscious of them. 
                                                                                                                                                        




Information in Malay-language 
The information written in the Malay-language serves the same 
purposes identified above. The heading identifies the tomb as “Makam 
Shuhada Trajedi Pada Hari 13 Tanwakhom 2518”. In the Malay-language, 
“makam” is usually applied only to prominent persons such as prophets, 
saints, and sultans or rajas. By identifying the grave as a “makam”, its 
planners and constructors have elevated the buried-persons to a high social 
standing. Similarly, by labeling the persons whose names are listed at the 
tomb as “wirachon” and “shuhada” (both terms may be loosely translated as 
“warrior”), it is hoped that the persons will be remembered in a positive light. 
The Arabic-derived term “shuhada”, however, carries a religious connotation 
as it is more accurately translated as “religious martyr”. 
The visit to Kubo Tok Ayah roused my interest in the event that is 
commemorated by Makam Shuhada 75. The tomb was clearly constructed as 
a monument; an embodiment of a narrative of a past event. What happened 
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in December 1975? Why is the event categorized as a “tragedy”? Why are the 
persons whose names are listed on the tomb labeled as shuhada; fallen 
heroes of the Islamic religion? 
The Tragedy of December 1975 in Malay Writings 
The eleven35 persons, whose names are listed at Makam Shuhada 75, 
died from injuries caused by grenade explosions on 13 December 1975. (A. 
Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 1994) The three grenades, which were allegedly 
thrown out of the compounds of Provincial Administrative Center of Pattani, 
caused approximately fifty other persons to sustain serious injuries. These 
casualties were participants of a massive demonstration against the Thai-
state over an alleged extra-judicial killing of five Malay residents of southern 
Thailand. (A. Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 1994) 
On 29 November 1975, six young Malay men were stopped by naval 
personnel while they were returning to their village, Kampong Hutan 
Berangan, in Saiburi-district of Pattani province. (A. Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 
1994) A. Malek (1993) claims further that the six young men had earlier been 
forcefully taken to a nearby temple and were instructed to worship a Buddha 
statue. When they refused to comply with the naval personnel’s orders, they 
were battered and stabbed. The six men, who were all thought to be dead, 
were subsequently disposed of at the nearby Saiburi River. (A. Malek 1993; 
Al-Fatani 1994) However, one of the six victims was still alive when several 
                                                          
35 The exact number of the event’s fatal casualty is unclear as it has varied according to 
different accounts of the incident. However, I have decided to follow the number of 
casualties that is listed on the tomb. 
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villagers found them; the sole survivor, who was fifteen years-old at that 
time, told others of his near-death experience. 
Stories about the alleged assault of the six Malay men by naval 
personnel circulated rapidly. When the authorities failed to identify and 
arrest the perpetrators of the murders, several Muslim students in Bangkok 
organized themselves and formed the “Southern Group” with the support of 
the radical National Students Council of Thailand (NSCT). (A. Malek 1993; Al-
Fatani 1994) The Southern Group, then, organized a demonstration in front 
of the Provincial Administrative Center of Pattani on 11 December 1975; 
under the banner of the, then newly formed, “People’s Defense Centre”. 
Approximately 1,000 demonstrators took part in this event. (A. Malek 1993; 
Al-Fatani 1994) 
The following demands were made: The authorities should identify 
the perpetrators of the murders and punish them accordingly; the 
government should pay a 5 million baht compensation to families of the 
victims of the alleged murders by naval personnel; the government should 
admit that the perpetrators were in fact officers of the state and withdraw 
naval personnel from the 3 provinces within a week; the Prime Minister, 
Kukrij Pramoj, should come to Pattani to accept the petition personally and 
provide necessary explanations to the crowd after which the Thai 
government should review its policies towards the largely Muslim-populated 
provinces of southern Thailand. (A. Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 1994) 
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Meanwhile, the crowd of demonstrators in front of the provincial 
administrative center continued to grow; the headcount was estimated at 
23,000 by the second day. (A. Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 1994) The third day, 
which coincided with Eid ul-Adha, attracted even more demonstrators. (A. 
Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 1994) By then, the size of the crowd was overwhelming 
as huge amounts of Muslims came from all the three Muslim-dominated 
provinces of southern Thailand to partake in the mass Eid-ul Adha prayer. 
Protest leaders took turns to deliver speeches to the crowd that day.  
Then, an unfortunate incident occurred; three grenades were hurled 
out of the compounds of the provincial administrative center into the 
demonstrating crowd, which until then had been protesting peacefully. (A. 
Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 1994) The explosions resulted in chaos; the panic 
intensified when electricity was cut-off by the police sending the surrounding 
environment into darkness. According to A. Malek (1993), an Islamic religious 
teacher, Ustaz Mahmud Abdul Latif, took to the stage amidst the chaos and 
recited the azan in order to calm the hysteria; he was shot at and 
subsequently died on the stage. The grenade explosions as well as random 
firing of firearms by the police took the lives of eleven demonstrators while 
approximately fifty others suffered serious injuries. (A. Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 
1994) 
Security was intensified after that incident. The demonstrators 
reorganized and shifted the protest site to the Pattani Central Mosque. (A. 
Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 1994) The anger and disappointment of the 
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demonstrators escalated when four of the fatal victims were being buried as 
martyrs at Kubo Tok Ayah. (Al-Fatani 1994) I was told by some Malays that 
Kubo Tok Ayah was chosen, in part, due to its proximity to the palace as well 
as the “Masjid Raja” or Sultan Mosque at Cabang Tiga. 
A series of negotiations took place between the “People’s Defense 
Centre” and government representatives. (A. Malek 1993; Al-Fatani 1994) 
Lieutenant General Sant Chitpattima, Security Commander in-charge of the 
Muslim-dominated provinces of southern Thailand, demanded that the 
Provincial Islamic Committee of Pattani retract its proclamation of 
martyrdom on the dead demonstrators. (A. Malek 1993) 
Another unfortunate incident took place on 19 January 1976 when a 
Sub-lieutenant Wanhawak, a policeman who is claimed to be drunk at that 
time, charged towards the demonstrators with his motorcycle; he was caught 
and beaten to death by them. (A. Malek 1993) Security personnel retaliated 
by charging at the crowd with four tanks while retrieving the slain officer’s 
body. 
The demonstrators persisted with their mission under the watchful 
eyes of Thailand’s security force until 24 January 1976; forty-five days since it 
began. (Al-Fatani 1994) Prime Minister Kukrij Pramoj visited Pattani after 
representatives of the government and the demonstrators came to a 
compromise. The details of the agreement are: the government promised to 
arrest the perpetrators of the murder at Saiburi; the government would 
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compensate the families of the all the Malay victims of events unfolded since 
29 November 1975; all naval personnel would be withdrawn from the 
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat; the government would punish the 
perpetrators of the grenade attack on the demonstrators in accordance to 
Thailand’s laws. (A. Malek 1993) 
In an address to Muslims of southern Thailand, Kukrij asserted that all 
Thai citizens are equal before the state regardless of their individual religious 
faith. (A. Malek 1993) However, Kukrij was less conciliatory while briefing 
security personnel stationed in southern Thailand; he encouraged them to 
defend Thai heritage, nation, and monarchy. He added that security threat 
posed by the “war” in southern Thailand was more critical than any conflict 
that was taking place in other regions of the country; including the activities 
of the communists in border areas of Thailand and Cambodia. (A. Malek 
1993) 
Al-Fatani (1994) claims that the promises made by the government in 
exchange for a cessation of the demonstration at Pattani Central Mosque in 
January 1976 were never fulfilled; in fact, he alleges that many of the leaders 
of the demonstration would one by one go missing. 
A. Malek (1993) opines that the events of December 1975 was 
instrumental in publicizing the Thai-state’s maltreatment of their Malay 
citizens. He optimistically claims that officers of the Thai-state could not 
afford to treat the Malays arbitrarily anymore; especially since the Malays 
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had become unified in their opposition to the Thai-state. I contend that A. 
Malek was perhaps too optimistic as the preceding chapter’s discussion has 
shown that many Malays continue to claim that they are still maltreated by 
officers of the Thai-state. 
The accounts of the “Tragedy of 13 December 1975” by A. Malek 
(1993) and Al-Fatani (1994) befits the categorization accorded by the 
Provincial Islamic Council of Pattani; the loss of civilian lives by the means of 
grenade explosions is indeed a tragedy. Thus, the writings of both writers 
serve as suitable narratives for the tomb and the event that it 
commemorates. But, how do the Malays of southern Thailand remember the 
event today? Do they think of the event as an incidence of “Siamese cruelty” 
as Bang Tah implied when he highlighted Kubo Tok Ayah to my attention? 
Malay Memories of the “Tragedy of 13 December 1975” 
After my first visit to Kubo Tok Ayah with Ayah Leh, Bang Ae, and Bang 
Mat, I decided to find out Bang Tah’s knowledge of the “Tragedy of 13 
December 1975”; Bang Tah was the first person to highlight the existence of 
the tomb to me. To my surprise, Bang Tah told me that he knew little of the 
incident. Like many other Malays whom I met, Bang Tah heard of the event 
as well as the existence of the tomb from conversations with other members 
of the Malay community. Furthermore, the coincidence of the year of the 
occurrence of the event with Bang Tah’s year of birth enhances Bang Tah’s 
awareness of the occurrence of the unfortunate incident that many Malays, 
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including Bang Tah, refer to as the “Perarakan Patani” or “Patani 
Demonstration”36. 
Ayah Leh, on the other hand, was able to relate the event in greater 
detail. Perhaps the training that Ayah Leh received in history at 
Chulalongkorn University accounts, in part, for his interest in reading about 
the event. In fact, it was Ayah Leh who lent me his personal copy of the book 
written by Ahmad Fathy Al-Fatani (1994) as he encouraged me to read about 
the tradgedy. Ayah Leh admitted to me that he was not personally involved in 
the demonstration as he was still working in Bangkok at that time. 
Bang Ae and Bang Mat had more personal accounts to tell. Both of 
them took part in that ill-fated demonstration. According to Bang Ae, who 
was a teenage student at a pondok in 1975, he was not very certain of the 
reasons and objective of the demonstration. He decided to take part in the 
demonstration when he heard rumors that the military had killed several 
Malay youth on a whim. He said that he was awed by the presence of such a 
massive crowd in front of the provincial administrative center. For him, the 
event displayed the unity of the Malays of southern Thailand as he recounted 
the extensive cooperation in logistical matters; “I can still remember that the 
womenfolk in Kampong Keli got together and prepared food for the 
demonstrators. When we got there, we distributed food to anyone within 
                                                          
36 Henceforth, “Patani Demonstration” shall refer to the demonstration that began on 11 
December 1975 and ended on 24 January 1976. The “Tragedy of 13 December 1975” shall 
refer specifically to the attack of civilian demonstrators by the Thai-state’s security force. 
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reach, regardless of the villages that they came from.” Bang Mat’s account of 
the event was similar to Bang Ae’s in many ways. Like Bang Ae, Bang Mat 
who originally hails from Yala was a student at a pondok. He, too, came to the 
demonstration site upon hearing about the “cruel murders” of the Malay 
youths. 
The most heart-rending account of the “Tragedy of 13 December 
1975” that I heard was from one of Bang Ae’s acquaintance named Wan Soh. 
Now in his sixties, Wan Soh sells groceries at the travelling market which 
comes to Kampong Keli on Wednesdays. Finding an appropriate time and 
place to meet-up with Wan Soh was difficult as he was uncomfortable with 
the unnecessary attention that we may attract should we visit him at home; 
he claims that his home has been randomly monitored by the security 
personnel ever since his involvement in the “Patani Demonstration”. 
I finally met Wan Soh in the morning of 24 August 2005 as the 
Wednesday market was operating at Kampong Keli. To my surprise, Wan Soh 
was keen to talk about the “Tragedy of 13 December 1975” from the onset; 
most persons would take some time to discern if I was trustworthy. Wan Soh 
directed Bang Ae and I to a spot in the shade, giving us all a brief respite from 
the searing sun; coincidentally away from the attention of two soldiers who 
were ‘providing security coverage’ at the market. 
Wan Soh claimed that he was personally involved in the organization 
of the “Pattani Demonstration”, 
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“I was involved in organizing the demonstration as a leader of 
one section of demonstrators; similar to the guerilla-style. We 
heard rumors that they were going to bomb us. I remember 
thinking that it will surely be the end for us should the bomb 
falls close to us. True enough, the bomb exploded close to 
where I was standing. The rain was falling heavily; nothing like 
the rain that I have experienced before. The water rose to this 
level (at this point Wan Soh pointed to his knees). I helped to 
carry two of my friends into the car and sent them to the 
hospital. One of them died, while the other one was badly 
injured on one side. I was very lucky to escape with minor 
injuries.” 
Wan Soh’s emotions intensified as he recalled the events. Tears began 
to roll down his cheeks and his eyes were blood red. Using his hands to point 
to an area on the left-side of his face, Wan Soh told me that that area of his 
friend’s face was blown off by the explosion. He said that he could still see 
images of his friends face vividly in his mind. Wan Soh, then, swiftly wiped 
away his tears. 
“I cannot really talk about this. I feel much pain here all the 
time (he pointed a finger at his heart). After the explosions, we 
shifted the demonstration to the central mosque. As the 
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mosque is a religious place, the Siamese37 would be slightly 
more constrained. We continued with the demonstration as 
we just wanted justice to be served as we desired before the 
bomb explosions.” 
My conversation with Wan Soh continued for several minutes 
more. Wan Soh’s emotions and description of the events of the 
“Tragedy of 13 December 1975” saddened me. It is not surprising, 
then, that most Malays with whom I talked about the event 
remember it is a sad or painful episode in their community’s history.  
The Impersonality of Historical Writings 
Malay memories of the “Tragedy of 13 December 1975”  is rather 
clear and similar to the master narrative of the account as exemplified by the 
writings of A. Malek (1993) and Al-Fatani (1994) as well as the information 
presented on the tomb itself; that the cruel38 Thai-state, which was 
represented by its security force, bombed innocent participants of a peaceful 
demonstration. From my interaction with several Malay persons in southern 
Thailand, I learnt that the event is clearly remembered as the subjection of 
the Malays in southern Thailand to the cruelty of the Thai-state. 
                                                          
37 Here, Siamese or siye, in the Patani-Malay language, refers to the Thai-state. The meaning 
of the term siye has to be interpreted with caution. It may change to mean ethnic-Siamese or 
the Thai-state depending on the context within which it is used. Based on my experiences in 
southern Thailand, the Malays hardly accuse ethnic-Siamese residents of southern Thailand 
of being cruel to them. Thus, when they say “kezolimae siye”, they usually refer to the 
“cruelties of the Thai-state”. 
38 The adjective that is often used to label the nature of the Thai-state in the Patani-Malay 
language is zalim. 
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The writings of Al-Fatani (1994) and especially A. Malek (1993) on the 
“Tragedy of 13 December 1975” capture the general development of events 
in that fateful December. Writing at a more macro-level, they inform readers 
of actions, decisions, and negations of and between the elite representatives 
of the Malay demonstrators as well the Thai-state. This is rather common as 
group social memories tend to ignore the lived experiences of the individual 
members of the group. (Anderson 1991) 
The oral recounting of the event by some Malays in southern 
Thailand, however, presents more personal, micro-level details that are not 
captured in written accounts of the event; the injuries, the suffering, the 
sadness, among others. It appears to me that some, and perhaps many, 
participants in the demonstration remain unsure of how to remember the 
event except that the way it unfolded was extremely unfortunate. Personal 
memories of violent episodes such as the “Patani Demonstration” remain 
vivid amongst older Malays who partook in the demonstration. For those 
who were not directly involved, were too young like Bang Tah, or was not 
born yet, the retelling of the events by members of their community sustains 
the remembrance of the “Patani Demonstration”. The Makam Shuhada 75 is, 
then, taken as the embodiment of the ‘truth’ of allegations of “Siamese 
cruelty” made by other, and in many cases older, members of their 
community; recall Bang Tah’s recommendation that I visit Kubo Tok Ayah 
where I would be able to see the “attestation to Siamese cruelty”. Such 
personal and collective memories of past violent episodes in relations 
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between the Thai-state and members of the Malays of southern Thailand are 
useful in trying to understand the present-day attitudes of members of the 
Malay community towards the Thai-state; indeed as Hobsbawm and Ranger 
have pointed out, social memories often disclose the functional and symbolic 
importance of a community’s past in the politics within which it is presently 
located. (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Peifer 2001) 
“Tombs of Martyrs” as Monuments of Injustice 
“Today members of the public may witness the Tombs of the 
Martyrs stand tall in Kubo Tok Ayah, adding another 
monument in the list of historical legacies of Cabang Tiga, in 
specific, and the nation of Patani in general. This tomb was 
built with extraordinary attributes compared to other graves in 
the same cemetery including the tombs of the rulers of 
Patani.” (Al-Fatani 1994: 192-193)39 
Monuments are erected in many communities around the world to 
enhance the remembering of various aspects of human social life and 
organization such as political movements, war, monarchical figures, and 
religious faith, amongst others. Monuments may act as “memory beacons” 
(Peifer 2001) that are intended to give directions to how people should 
remember such events, movements, and persons. 
                                                          
39 The translation is my own. 
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“Monuments contain, or point to, traces of collective memory, which 
is a way public memory could be produced.” (Satha-Anand 2007: 13) The 
process of memory production at Makam Shuhada 75 is circular as Satha-
Anand’s statement suggests. The information furnished on the wall of the 
tomb provides clues to the collective memories of some members of the 
Malay community in southern Thailand; that the fatal victims of the events of 
December 1975 are martyrs and that their deaths were a tragedy. Thus, the 
tomb is a result of collective remembering. Simultaneously, as the preceding 
paragraph has stated, the tomb functions as a monument that serves to steer 
the production of collective memory in regards to the “Tragedy of 13 
December 1975” especially to first-time visitors like me who are initially 
unaware of the occurrence of the ill-starred events. 
Although the erection of a monument is usually complemented with 
an accompanying narrative, monuments nonetheless remain ambiguous due 
to its “conceptualized and reified nature” (Tanabe and Keyes 2002: 6). 
Studies of two monuments in Thailand, the “Bullet Monument” in Narathiwat 
by Satha-Anand (2007) and the “Thao Suranari Monument in Nakhon 
Ratchasima by Keyes (2002), show that monuments are consistently caught 
in tussles for meaning that reflect power struggles in society. Meanings and 
narratives associated with monuments are often constructed and reproduced 
by various quarters that are involved in the socio-political milieu that 
surrounds the monuments. (Keyes 2002; Satha-Anand 2007; Troyansky 1987) 
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The “Patani Demonstration” is not always remembered as a two-
partied conflict between the Malays and the Thai-state. A conversation 
between Bang Mat and me while we were on a visit to Yala added nuance to 
the narrative of the event. Bang Mat and I talked casually about the 
cemeteries that I have visited in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat amidst the 
sounds of rain splattering on the roof of the stilted house where we spent the 
night. Bang Mat appeared reluctant at first, but then went on to ask me for 
my opinion on the issue of whether it was right for the Provincial Islamic 
Committee of Pattani to bestow martyrdom onto the slain participants of the 
“Patani Demonstration”. Sensing that Bang Mat had an opinion of his own, I 
asked him for the reason for his question. 
“I do not really agree that they are martyrs because the 
Pattani Demonstration involved a lot of secular politics. 
Actually the demonstrators were not just protesting against 
the Thai government. I remember clearly that many of us were 
shouting derogatory slogans against Kusoh40 such as Kusoh 
Kurap41. If I remember correctly, the support of the 
                                                          
40 Kusoh is the colloquial reference for Tengku Soh or Prince Soh. Kusoh is a descendant of 
the Raja of Jambu(now a sub-district in Amphoe Yaring, Pattani), a Bangkok-Muslim who was 
appointed to the throne of Jambu by the Rama I when Siam divided Patani into 7 provinces. 
See A. Malek, Mohd Zamberi 
1993 Umat Islam Patani: Sejarah dan Politik. Shah Alam: HIZBI. 
 
41 Kurap is a type of skin-disease. Thus, the slogan “Kusoh Kurap” could either be taken as a 
slander or a curse. 
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demonstrators were divided amongst three politicians; Kusoh, 
Din Jerman, and Din Tok Minah42.” 
Bang Mat’s comments show that individual members of the 
community are not passive supporters of narratives that are arranged and 
supported by the community’s elites and historians. While it is true that the 
Thai-state was the main target of the crowd’s protests, the crowd itself was 
not monolithic in its aims. The monumental Makam Shuhada 75, writings of 
A. Malek (A. Malek 1993) and Al-Fatani (1994), as well as most oral accounts 
that I have heard failed to portray such nuances in the unfolding of events 
associated with the “Patani Demonstration”. Perhaps also the current 
political climate in the three provinces, where many Malays are suspicious of 
Thailand’s security personnel, influence people’s personal recounting of the 
“Patani Demonstration” as a two-partied conflict between the Thai-state and 
their community. Or, perhaps they intend to use me as a messenger to tell 
outsiders of the cruelty of the Thai-state; at least to those who read my 
thesis. Whatever the reasons are, Bang Mat’s account of the event has 
highlighted the tendency of historiography to be detached from the lived 
experiences of persons who were involved in the event. It is for this reason, 
and the possible existence of others with their own personal accounts of the 
                                                          
42 Din Tok Minah is the descendant of another influential figure in the politics between the 
Malays of southern Thailand and the Thai-state, Haji Sulong. Haji Sulong was a Malay Islamic 
religious leader who submitted a petition to the Thai government in 1947. Subsequently, he 
was arrested and would later go missing. Many Malays believe that Haji Sulong became a 
victim of extra-judicial killings by the state’s security forces. 
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event, that monuments always elude “final” interpretation. (Troyansky 1987: 
123) 
Monumentalizing the Shuhada of 28 April 2004 at Jaha and 
Sebayo 
Makam Shuhada 75 is not the only burial site that has been 
constructed some Malays of southern Thailand to serve as a monument for 
the alleged violence of the Thai-state on their community. Some of the Malay 
fatal casualties of the violence that erupted in January 2004 are considered 
martyrs by some members of the Malay community and are buried in a 
similar manner to those at Makam Shuhada 75. I visited two of such burial 
sites; one in Jaha-district of Yala and another in Sebayo-district in Songkhla. 
These two burial sites, which are associated with more recent events, 
exemplify the ambiguity that characterizes such tombs and monuments. 
Villagers whom I met at both locations claim that both tombs are fashioned 
as sites of memory; memorializing the young men’s violent deaths allegedly 




Graves of Martyrs at Kampong Tebu 
 
Close-up of Gravestone 
On 24 August 2004, Bang Mat and I visited Kampong Tebu of Jaha-
district in Yala. I decided to return to the village in order to learn more about 
the tombs of martyrs located in the village’s cemetery that I saw while on a 
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visit with a sub-committee of the National Reconciliation Commission earlier. 
The graves of six of the young men who died in a clash with security officers 
on 28 April 2004 are arranged neatly in a straight row. The positioning of the 
individual graves as well as the tombstones seems to communicate a sense of 
unity and uniformity. 
During the visit by members of the NRC, the village headman claimed 
that the villagers never intended to have the word “shahid”43 inscribed onto 
the tombstones, but that the tombstones were already being prepared when 
the villagers placed their order at the workshop with the word already 
inscribed. The village headman’s statement could be true, although I suspect 
that he may have made the statement for fear of potential reprisals from the 
Thai-government and the bureaucracy for the village’s decision to categorize 
the alleged militants as martyrs. Many Malays in southern Thailand exercise 
much caution in divulging their personal opinions of the conflict for fear that 
they will be accused of being a part of, or at least sympathizing with, the 
insurgency. Indeed, several villagers informed me that they agree with 
granting of martyrdom on the six slain men as they maintained that the men 
sincerely believed that they were fighting for a cause; the six young men told 
everyone that they were going to carry out “dakwah”44 activities. 
                                                          
43 Shahid is a Malay-word of Arabic-origin that means “martyr”. The term “shuhada”, which 
has appeared many times in this chapter, is the plural term for shahid. 
44“Dakwah” means “sermon”.  Dakwah groups usually comprise of several men who travel 
from village to another where they will stop-over to rest in the village mosque. They would 
then invite residents of the village to come to the mosque to listen to the leader of the group 
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Bang Mat and I also had the chance to listen to other stories that 
emerged as a consequence of the events of 28 April 2004. It is difficult to 
ascertain the veracity of these stories, as I have discussed in the preceding 
chapter; nevertheless these stories, or rumors, are important as a 
background for those intending to rationalize the suspicious attitude of many 
Malays towards the Thai-state. Several men questioned the need to kill the 
alleged militants as the security officers firearms could easily overwhelm the 
alleged militants, some of whom were only equipped with knives while 
others were unarmed. Furthermore, some residents of Jaha-district found the 
unusually quick response of the security personnel following the first gunshot 
to be dodgy. According to some residents, there would usually only be two 
soldiers guarding the area where the clash took place. However, that area 
was full of soldiers within five minutes after the initial gunshot on that day. 
Such questions and information led many residents to believe that the 
security force must have received some intelligence prior to the occurrence 
of the clash, but would like to kill the alleged militants, nonetheless, so as to 
communicate the Thai-state’s intention to exterminate any militant 
movement in the three provinces. 
The atmosphere throughout the conversation that I had with a group 
of residents at Ban Kejal was grim. The father of one of the victims managed 
to maintain his composure quite well during the conversation, although his 
                                                                                                                                                        
lecture on religious issues. The group would sometimes grow in numbers as some residents 
of the village that they have visited may join them. 
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face could not hide the pain and sadness that he was feeling. He had to wipe 
off his tears several times during the conversation, affecting the mood of 
others involved in the conversation including myself. The group concurred 
that the tombs of the martyrs in their village are a witness to “Siamese 
cruelty” towards their community, and at the time of my fieldwork, villagers 
of Ban Tebu would visit the tombs almost daily to offer prayers for the six 
“martyrs” and maintain the state of the tombs as well as the cleanliness of 
the area around them. These visits augment the effectiveness of the tombs in 
maintaining remembrance of the regrettable event, at least amongst 
residents of Ban Tebu. 
Bang Mat and I left for Sebayo-disticrt in Songkla in the morning after 
our visit to Jaha-district in Yala. Bang Seng, one of Bang Mat’s relative from 
Jaha, accompanied us as Bang Mat did not know anyone from Sebayo; that 
would make it very difficult to talk to anyone about the burial site of the 
eighteen45 men from the district that died on 28 April 2004 after clashing 
with security officers. 
Initially it appeared as if we were not in luck. Bang Seng’s friend had 
gone out to harvest long kong, a type of local fruit, at his orchard. We 
decided to have a drink at a coffee-shop in the village while we wait to see if 
Bang Seng’s friend would come home soon after. 
                                                          
45 The death toll at Sebayo was nineteen. These young men were members of a village 
football team. One of them, a resident of another district, was buried at a separate location.  
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I decided to talk to an old man who was also having a drink at the 
coffee-shop as we continued our wait. I asked him if he was familiar with the 
graves of the eighteen youth. The old man and the lady who was operating 
the coffee-shop made it a point to highlight to us that the eighteen young 
men who died on 28 April 2004 was not from their village; they were from 
the neighboring village instead. Maybe they were skeptical of our identities 
and do not want their village to be implicated in the unrest. Bang Seng 
concurred while also suggesting the possibility that the old man and the lady 
considered the young men who were killed as reprobates. Indeed, the old 
man told me that several adults advised the group of young men against 
carrying out their plans when they gathered at that coffee-shop on 27 April 
2004. According to him, some of the young men responded by saying, 
“’You are too old to understand. If you don’t want to join us, 
don’t try to stop us.’ Young people these days, they don’t 
listen to older people. We know better because we have seen 
what happened twenty to thirty years ago.” 
After about one-hour of waiting, another man, who was probably in 
his thirties, and had joined our conversation at the coffee-shop offered to 
take us to the neighboring village to meet the father of one of the young men 
who died. Shortly before we left, the old man whom we suspect was our new 
guide’s father-in-law, told him, “You must not go to the grave!” The old 
man’s words and actions clearly indicate the deep-set fear that the on-going 
violence in the area has caused. 
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The person that we were brought to was Tok Nae Bae Teh46, the 
headman of the neighboring village. We joined him at the outdoor platform 
where he was sitting and chatting with several other men. After giving 
greetings, we introduced ourselves. Tok Nae Bae Teh took a good look at 
Bang Mat and then said that he thinks that they may have crossed paths 
before. When Bang Mat told him that his late-father was a dikir barat47 
teacher, the Tok Nae Bae Teh managed a smile and concurred that he knew 
Bang Mat’s late-father. 
Bang Seng then asked Tok Nae Bae Teh if he personally knew one of 
the eighteen youth who was married to someone from Bang Seng’s village. 
The headman answered by identifying that person as his son. So as it 
unfolded, Tok Nae Bae Teh, Bang Mat, and Bang Seng shared familial ties. 
This revelation paved the opportunity for me to ask questions regarding the 
graves. After I explained the intention behind my visit, Tok Nae Bae Teh told 
me that he had stopped consenting to interview requests as nothing 
beneficial had been achieved from them; he thinks that only the media 
gained from the interviews as they had something sensational to report on. 
However, he said that he was willing to answer any questions that I had as he 
wishes that I would “write about the incident and let others around the world 
know about it.” 
                                                          
46 “Tok Nae Bae” in Patani-Malay or “puu yai ban” in Thai-language means “village 
headman”. 
47 “Dikir Barat” is a type of traditional Malay performing art. 
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The village headman told us that he never thought that his son would 
get involved in violent activities. He said, “He was a good kid and quite a 
talented sportsman. He played football and sepaktakraw competitively at 
several levels.” Bang Seng concurred by adding that Tok Nae Bae Teh’s son 
would join his village’s youth for a game of soccer every evening after he 
moved into his wife’s maiden home following their marriage. 
“That night, he packed his things. I asked him about where he 
was going. He told me that he was going to join the dakwah 
activities. After that, I didn’t ask him any more questions 
because he always go on dakwah trips. Furthermore, dakwah 
is a good activity; which parent would disallow his son to do it? 
Then, the next day I heard that some youth had died after 
clashing with soldiers. Subsequently, someone called me to tell 
me that my son and grandson were involved. We had to wait 
until night before we were allowed to bring their corpses 
home. We buried all of them the next day. We couldn’t dig the 
ground the usual way. We had to use an excavator”, said Tok 
Nae Bae Teh with tears trickling down his face. 
Tok Nae Bae Teh told me that the villagers decided not to wash the 
corpses before burying them. Such is the usual practice when burying Islamic 
religious martyrs. The headman’s wife who had joined us at the platform a 
few minutes earlier then called out to me lightly and related a story similar to 
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the headman’s, drawing me out of the group’s conversation. She was more 
emotional and had to wipe away her tears more often that the headman. 
According to Tok Nae Bae Teh, the graves of the young men who died 
on 28 April 2004 are constructed as a place of memory. He added that the 
construction process of the grave was not yet completed as the funds 
donated by residents of the village was insufficient; thus, they opted to carry 
out the construction progressively.  Tok Nae Bae Teh’s wife then told us that 
some people claim that the graves and the surrounding area always smell 
nice.48 The headman said that some villagers would congregate at the grave 
every Friday; they would go there after performing the prayer at dawn, say 
some prayers for the “martyrs”, and then have breakfast together at a hut 
that has been constructed beside the graves. 
By then, the conversation was becoming overwhelming for Tok Nae 
Bae Teh. He said that he can still feel the pain in his heart whenever he thinks 
or talk about the incident. He, then, suggested that Bang Mat, Bang Seng, and 
I, follow one of his friends to visit the burial site. 
                                                          
48 Several people in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have told me before that the burial sites of 




Gated graves of martyrs at Sebayo 
 
Temporary Tombstones 
We boarded Bang Seng’s pick-up truck and travelled for five minutes 
along a narrow path amidst the foliage. Two concrete structures greeted us 
immediately upon arriving at the cemetery; the gated graves of the “martyrs” 
of 28 April 2004 and a hut adjoining it. 
It was obvious that the construction of the burial site was incomplete. 
Tok Nae Bae Teh’s friends briefed us of the village’s plans to plaster and paint 
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the gate as well as purchase nice matching tombstones for the eighteen 
graves. The words “The Incident of 28 April” were engraved into the stairs 
leading up to the raised floor of the hut beside the graves. We took a peak 
into the holes in the concrete blocks that formed the gate and saw that the 
eighteen graves were arranged neatly with a pair of broken concrete blocks 
used as markers for each grave. Just like the graves of shuhada at Kubo Tok 
Ayah and Jaha, the arrangement of the graves and grave markers exude a 
sense of unity and uniformity. As Tok Nae Bae Teh said, “The villagers said 
that since they died together, we should bury them together.” Thus, the 
positioning of the graves at the entrance of the cemetery, its physical 
structure, the arrangement of the graves, as well as the engraved words on 
the stairs of the hut, clearly indicate the intention of the villagers to use the 
burial site as a place of memory where the villagers’ agency over memory 
production is articulated. Also, if the words of Tok Nae Bae Teh are a good 
indication of the sentiments of the villagers, then we may deduce that the 
villagers will remember the incident as an episode of the Thai-state’s injustice 
towards their community. The act of burying the corpses of the young men 
without washing them first, which is in line with the Islamic burial practice for 
martyrs, strengthens this claim. 
However, as the Malay community’s experience with Makam 
Shuhada 75 has pointed out, the monumental structure and its 
accompanying narrative does not guarantee that people’s memories of the 
incidents would be uniform. Like an art piece that is subject to the varying 
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interpretations of its individual viewers, monuments such as the graves of 
shuhada at Kubo Tok Ayah, Jaha, and Sebayo, is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations. Similarly, the individuals who are buried at the three 
monumental graves may not always be seen as “martyrs”; their titles as 
“martyrs” may be doubted, as Bang Mat did in regards to the syuhaha of 
December 1975. Nonetheless, most people with whom I talked about the 
incidents of December 1975 and 28 April 2004 seem to believe in the 
narratives that accompany these monumental graves. According to some 
residents of the villages in Jaha and Sebayo districts, they are aware that their 
efforts in constructing the graves will not guarantee that everyone will 
remember the incident in the same way as they have intended, but they felt 
that it was necessary for them to attempt to ensure that the injustice that 
members of their communities have been subjected to is not easily 
forgotten. 
Megalithic Statues: Monuments and Politics in 
Thailand 
The twentieth century witnessed a proliferation of monuments in 
Thailand. The construction of national monuments in Thailand began with the 
erection of statues of the king of Siam during the reign of King Mongkut, or 
Rama IV, that lasted from 1851 through 1868. It quickly gained momentum 
during the next two reigns, that of King Chulalongkorn and King Vajiravudh. 
By 1933, a year after the transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional 
monarchy in Thailand, a Department of Fine Arts was set up and placed 
77 
 
under to auspices the Ministry of Education to oversee the training and 
development of young Thai artists who would be commissioned to build 
official sculptures and monuments. (Poshyananda 1992; Wong 2006) 
The role of monuments as a powerful ‘accomplice’ and vehicle for 
political ideologies has a very long history. In Southeast Asia, megalithic 
temples such as Angkor Wat as well as Borobudur are lucid examples of this 
link. In short, monuments may be used for the furtherance of the political 
agendas of the key political institutions of the day; the monarchy and 
government in contemporary Thailand. Public monuments reflect a “desire to 
promote official dogma” (Wong 2006: 146). 
Statues of Thai kings, especially those of the ruling Chakri dynasty, are 
prominently featured in the collection of monuments that adorn Thailand’s 
capital city, Bangkok. An example of such statues is the Equestrian Statue of 
King Chulalongkorn, which commemorates the fortieth anniversary of the 
ruler’s reign. This statue’s design was inspired by the statue of King Louis XIV 
on horseback in Versailles during his visit in 1907. (Wong 2006) Wong argues 
that this monument was instrumental in engendering Siamese absolute 
monarchism. “The image of King Chulalongkorn was the embodiment of the 
nation … It was through his grace and guidance that the country would 
progress and prosper.” (Wong 2006: 34) Prior to Chulalongkorn’s reign, 
Siamese kings have always ruled based on a system of patronage known as 
the sakdina system, in which powerful aristocratic families acted as the 
bureaucratic hands of Siam’s rulers. (Reynolds 2006; Wong 2006) The Thai 
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king, presently King Bhumibol Adulyadej, continues to be highly revered, 
perhaps even considered sacred, in contemporary Thai society. 
Monuments are also built to foster nationalist fervor in Thailand; 
although the message may differ or change from time to time and with 
changes of government. Despite not being known to be a democratic leader, 
Field Marshall Plaek Phibunsonggram (hereafter Phibun) commissioned the 
construction of a monument at Rajadamnern Avenue known today as the 
Democracy Monument in 1939. This megalithic monument commemorates 
the overthrow of the absolute monarchy by a coup d'état in 1932. Although 
this monument displayed a more inclusive vision of society through the 
featuring of ‘ordinary people’, Phibun’s military background appears to have 
crept into the intended message of the monument. The military is glaringly 
figured in the relief panels that embellish the monument, especially in the 
panel of “Soldiers Fighting for Democracy”. (Wong 2006) 
The proliferation of monuments since the reign of Mongkut is not 
restricted to Bangkok. Many monuments have been erected in provinces 
outside the capital. Monarchic images continue to be featured in most 
provinces in Thailand that I have visited. The clock towers in Pattani, Yala, 
and Narathiwat, are all emblazoned with a large picture of the present king. 
Elsewhere in Thailand, statues of heroes and heroines were built to serve as 
examples of the heroism of the individual and groups of Thais in defending 
their beloved nation. The monuments of the “Sisters Thao Thepsatri and 
Thao Srisunthorn” in Phuket, “Queen Suriyothai”, “Princess Suphankalaya” in 
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Pitsanulok, “Bang Rachan villagers” in Singburi, and Thao Suranari in Nakhorn 
Ratchasima, among others, represent the loyalty, courage, and sacrifice of 
Thais from various strata of society in the face of foreign aggression in the 
past. (Keyes 2002; Rajanubhab 2000; Satha-Anand 2007; Wong 2006) Such 
monuments remind members of contemporary Thai society of the need to 
defend the sovereignty of their nation-state as well as the virtuousness of 
such character traits. These monuments are indeed provincial manifestations 
of the political ideals that various political elites advocate; these ideals are 
convenient to any political leader who wishes to uphold the oneness of the 
Thai nation-state. 
The Obscurity of the “Tombs of Martyrs” 
The monumental graves discussed in this chapter do not possess the 
same prominence in Thai society that other monuments found in Thailand, 
which I have mentioned above, have. Like the “Bullet Monument” found in 
the compound of a police station in Narathiwat, which commemorates the 
clash between security officers and some Malays at Dusun Nyor in 1948, the 
monumental graves at Kubo Tok Ayah, Jaha and Sebayo districts, are “silent” 
(Satha-Anand 2007). These monuments are not featured prominently in 
Thailand’s socio-political landscape, unlike the above-mentioned 
monuments. 
One of reasons for the silence of these monumental graves is that 
there is very little ‘physical interaction’ between them and people beyond 
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the communities that surround them. Most Malays in Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, visit cemeteries only during certain occasions throughout the 
year. Many other monuments in Thailand such as statues of Thai kings in 
Bangkok, and regional heroes such as Thao Suranari and Queen Suriyothai, 
are revered by many Thai-Buddhists; throngs of people visit these statues 
regularly to pray and make offerings. (Keyes 2002; Satha-Anand 2007; Tanabe 
and Keyes 2002; Wong 2006) Islam, the religion of most Malays in southern 
Thailand, forbids its adherents from worshiping idols as well entities other 
than God; hence, the practice of worshipping at graves of saints, or keramat, 
has gradually been frowned upon leading to a huge reduction in such acts. 
The silence of these monumental graves may also be due to some of 
their physical traits. Unlike monumental statues that have been mentioned, 
these graves are not megalithic. Furthermore, they are located within 
cemeteries amongst many other graves. These cemeteries are usually not 
found at the forefront of the town’s landscape. Hence, the monumental 
graves at Kubo Tok Ayah, Jaha and Sebayo districts are less noticeable to 
people despite being physically prominent within the compounds of these 
cemeteries. 
The socio-political circumstances surrounding these monumental 
graves also contribute to their silence. Monuments such as the national and 
regional statues mentioned earlier suit Thailand’s nation-building projects as 
well as other elite political institutions in Thai society such as the monarchy 
and the military; thus, earning them a position amongst other national 
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monuments that are recognized by the Fine Arts Department. (Keyes 2002; 
Wong 2006) 
The monumental graves discussed here do not serve the interests of 
Thai nationalism or any key political institution in Thailand. In fact, these 
monumental graves may be seen by some as being anti-state; although many 
Malays would deny this. As mentioned earlier, these graves are meant to act 
as beacons for the remembrance of the crimes of the Thai-state against the 
Malay community in southern Thailand. Hence, these monumental graves 
should remain clandestine as their narrative will not sit comfortably with 
many others in Thailand including her political elites. Such monuments of 
resistance are likely to remain publicly inconspicuous unless there is a change 
of hands at the top of the political structure whereby the new person or 
regime in power is able to use these monumental graves for the purpose of 
discrediting earlier regimes or if the new regime comprise actors in the 
resistance movement themselves. 
According to Wong (2006), monuments need to interact with people’s 
lives in order to remain relevant. The outbreak and continued occurrence of 
violence in southern Thailand contribute to the increased relevance of graves 
such as Makam Shuhada 75 as well as those graves of “martyrs” located in 
Jaha and Sebayo districts. The violence that takes place almost daily acts as 
triggers for the remembering of the events of the “Patani Demonstration” as 
well as the events of 28 April 2004. Thus, despite the lack of ‘physical 
interaction’ between these graves and members of the Malay community, 
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many Malays retain memories of these events even after years and decades 
of their occurrences. 
Conclusion: Cemeteries as Windows to the Past 
Studies of monuments in Thailand tend to focus on national and 
‘public’ monuments; there is also a tendency for such monuments to be 
megalithic. (Keyes 2002; Poshyananda 1992; Wong 2006) This chapter 
employs a more inclusive categorization of “monuments” in this chapter by 
treating non-megalithic constructions such as Makam Shuhada 75 and the 
graves of “martyrs” in Jaha and Sebayo districts as monuments. These graves 
have been treated as examples of non-national or ‘non-public’ monuments in 
this chapter. 
Cemeteries are repositories of history; every grave is the abode of a 
person, who figured, although in varying degrees of significance, in the 
historical development of a community or society. Historical accounts of 
society should not be limited to the written, or even oral, accounts of its elite 
members. Ideally, it should be the aggregation of the life stories of every 
member of the society. However, it is probably impossible to combine the 
autobiographies of all of the society’s members. But, it is worthwhile to 
identify graves that are socially significant, such as the ones discussed in this 
chapter, which may act as platforms through which we may begin our quest 
to study aspects of the larger community that hosts them. 
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This study of several graves of “martyrs” found in southern Thailand 
shows that many Malays maintain memories of past events whereby the 
Thai-state is deemed to have acted cruelly against members of their 
community. Such memories contribute to the sustenance of Malay suspicions 
and animosity for the Thai-state. The construction of these graves of 
“martyrs” is, in fact, an expression of resistance against the Thai nation-state; 
these graves and their accompanying narratives are meant to subvert the 
Thai-state’s official notion of these slain men as rebels or even terrorists. 
According to some Malays, this mode of resistance is apt because of the 
potential reprisals that their community may face if they adopt other less 
clandestine options. To highlight this position, I was told that the graves of 
the nine youth who were killed at Krisek Mosque on 28 April 2004 have not 
been constructed as a monument, unlike those found in Jaha and Sebayo 
districts, because of the massive attention that the clash at that mosque 
attracted due to the huge significance of the Krisek Mosque in the history of 
the Malays of southern Thailand. Hence, the construction of a monumental 
grave to commemorate these nine “martyrs” may draw chastisements and 
potential counter-action from the Thai state and possibly even other 




THE PAST IN THE PRESENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
HISTORY IN PRESENT-DAY RELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE THAI NATION-STATE AND THE MALAYS OF 
SOUTHERN THAILAND 
 
My first visit to southern Thailand took place in February 2002. I 
arrived as an ignorant visitor; unaware that there were local residents who 
could converse in Malay. Ayah Leh, who was working at the Prince of 
Songkhla University at that time, took me to Ban Keli where he thought 
would be a suitable place to base the community service project that I was 
organizing; the project involved a group of students from the National 
University of Singapore and eventually took place in May 2002. 
After initial discussions with several of Ban Keli’s community leaders, 
Ayah Leh told Bang Ae, whom I had just met, to accompany me to a coffee-
shop while he went to look up some of his friends at their homes. 
Bang Ae came across as a man of quiet disposition; he looked serious 
the whole time we talked. There was an aura of awkwardness between us as 
we both sipped at cups of coffee while exchanging a sporadic word or two. I 
decided to break the silence by divulging my ignorance of the local culture 
and the community’s history. I told him that I did not know that there were 
many Malays living in Thailand. Bang Ae simply smiled and then said that the 
three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat formerly made up one Malay 
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kingdom. He told me that the kingdom of Patani, a long time ago, was rich 
and very famous. Band Ae, then, pointed in the direction of the sea, which 
could be seen through a window at the coffee-shop and said that his father 
used to tell him that many trading ships would sail into Patani Bay and anchor 
there while trade was being conducted. He added that the older people in 
the village claimed that salt produced in Patani was very famous throughout 
the region. Bang Ae then sighed before saying that the situation has changed 
greatly. 
Until the re-emergence of the violent conflict in southern Thailand, 
the Malays of that region seemed to have been forgotten; dissipated from 
many people’s mental maps of Malay communities in the Southeast Asian 
region. A check with my friends and relatives in Singapore and Malaysia 
proved that I was not alone in ignorance. Many people in my parents’ 
generation were also unaware of the existence of a large Malay population in 
southern Thailand; although a separatist conflict took place there as recently 
as the 1970s. 
I continued to travel to various parts of Thailand after my first visit to 
the south in February 2002. I learnt that many Thais from other regions in 
Thailand also possess such a tenuous amount of knowledge about their 
countrymen who are ethnic-Malays. Similarly, very little is mentioned of the 




This chapter is about the struggle of the Malays of southern Thailand 
against being assimilated into what they perceive to be a relatively 
homogenized national culture; one that emphasizes ethnic-Thai culture 
through language and Buddhism. Many of these Malays claim that they are 
contented to be citizens of Thailand, but take measures to ensure that certain 
aspects of their community’s history and, consequently, ethnic identity are 
not obliterated. These actions are not an expression of separatism, but they 
reflect a desire for a more diverse understanding of what it means to be a 
Thai. Many of the Malays of southern Thailand feel that they are held in 
suspicion by many of their fellow citizens; indicating some lack of comfort 
amongst other Thais for the distinct ethno-cultural identity of the Malays of 
southern Thailand. They claim that they are sometimes treated differently by 
other Thai citizens when their identity as a Malay or Muslim from Pattani, 
Yala, or Narathiwat is divulged; they claim, however, that this does not 
happen in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. I have a personal experience that 
relates to this claim; this incident took place in October 2005. 
I was then in Phuket Island to visit some friends. Shortly after I arrived 
at the bus terminal, a taxi driver who was looking for passengers tried to 
make small talk with me by asking, “Where did you come from?” I was not 
sure if he meant to ask for my country of origin or the place from which I had 
just arrived. I told him that I came from Pattani. He quickly asked, “Aren’t you 
afraid? Living in Pattani?” I told him that I was, but I tried not to let my fear 
affect me too much. Suddenly, he launched into a diatribe, “Of course you 
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are not afraid. They (The insurgents) will not kill you. But, they kill my people! 
They kill my monks!” He, then, shook his head and left. I was shocked by his 
words. The experience made me think about how the Malays from Pattani, 
Yala, and Narathiwat would feel if they were faced with a similar situation. 
What was Patani? : Contested histories of the Malays 
of southern Thailand 
The historical kingdom of Patani is a contested entity. Historical 
writings and social memories of this kingdom, from which the present 
population of Malays in the southern Thailand provinces of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, claim origin, can be generally divided into two strands; one falls 
within the narrative of Thailand’s nationalist history while the other is rooted 
in traditional Malay notions of their community’s past. It is important to be 
aware of these contested images of the Malay community’s history as they 
are vital in shaping the varied and often conflicting perceptions of and 
attitudes towards the various parties involved in the on-going conflict in 
southern Thailand. 
Malay Writings about “Patani” 
The image of Patani in most Malay writings coincides with the image 
that Bang Ae painted during our conversation at the coffee-shop that was 
described earlier.  (A. Malek 1993; A. Malek 1994; Al-Fatani 1994; Syukri 
2005; Teeuw and Wyatt 1970) These writings claim that the Kingdom of 
Patani as an independent kingdom that was ruled by generations of 
sovereign rulers between the earlier decades of the sixteenth century until it 
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was finally dealt its first defeat at the hands of Siam’s army in 1786. (A. Malek 
1993; A. Malek 1994; Syukri 2005) 
The Kingdom of Patani is also purported to have figured prominently 
in the network of kingdoms in the Southeast Asian region. In fact, Patani also 
played host to many travelers and traders from Europe, the Middle East as 
well as various parts of Asia such as Japan and China. (A. Malek 1994) 
The fame of the kingdom is captured in the words of an early 
seventeenth century German traveler named Mandelslohe,  
 “Patani is a very prosperous country. The people of Patani are 
able to eat fruits of scores of different kinds each month. 
Chickens here lay eggs twice each day. The paddy is 
exceedingly plentiful; there are many kinds of meat such as 
beef, mutton, goose, duck, chicken, capon, peacock, deer, 
mouse-deer, and birds, together with hundreds of kinds of 
fruits.” (Syukri 2005: 32) 
Patani’s prosperity was made possible, in part, by its position as a 
vibrant center of trade in the Southeast Asian region at that time. (A. Malek 
1994; Al-Fatani 1994; Reid c1988-1993; Syukri 2005; Teeuw and Wyatt 1970) 
Patani’s importance as a trading center came about, in part, by the declining 
trade of Melaka under Portuguese rule. (A. Malek 1994; Reid c1988-1993) 
Trading rights in Patani was so highly valued that the British and Dutch ships 
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exchanged fire as a result of a conflict over trading issues in Patani. (A. Malek 
1994) 
The Kingdom of Patani was also renowned for being at the forefront 
of Islamic scholarship in the Southeast Asian region. (A. Malek 1993; A. Malek 
1994; Al-Fatani 1994; Al-Fatani 2001; Reid c1988-1993; Syukri 2005) Malay 
writings on Patani’s history point out how Islamic scholars from Patani 
traveled to various parts of the Southeast Asian region and even went as far 
as Mecca in search of, as well as spread, knowledge of the religion. (Al-Fatani 
2001) In July 2007, I met a Madurese Islamic religious teacher, who lived in 
Mecca for approximately a decade, who told me that Islamic scholars from 
Patani such as Sheikh Daud al-Fatani and Sheikh Ahmad al-Fatani count 
amongst the most prominent Islamic thinkers of Malay-origin. Both scholars 
wrote and published books quite extensively in the Malay as well as Arabic 
language. (Abdullah 1990; Abdullah 2005; Al-Fatani 2001; Sujimon 2003) 
Some of their books are still being studied by Muslims in the contemporary 
era. Hence, due to the importance of Patani as a center of learning amongst 
Muslims of Southeast Asia as well as the esteemed Islamic scholars it 
produced, the Kingdom of Patani earned its reputation as ‘serambi Mekah’49 
amongst some Muslims in the region. 
The historical Kingdom of Patani’s pre-eminent past engenders pride 
amongst Malays of southern Thailand, even in the present-day. The kingdom 
                                                          
49 “Serambi Mekah” is translated as “The Veranda of Mecca”. 
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is memorialized by members of the contemporary Malay population of 
southern Thailand as a glorious independent political entity that was 
prosperous in trade and prominent in Islamic scholarship as exemplified by 
the following quote from A. Malek who referred to Patani as a “symbol of 
Malay glory” (1994: 12-55) 
“The sixteenth century shows Patani as a most prominent 
empire in the Malay world. It attracted both regional and 
international traders from the East and the West. The 
prosperity of Patani shows that Patani had achieved the status 
of a strong and stable economy. This achievement was due to 
the wisdom of the Malay rajas of Patani. They are the symbols 
of the success of traditional Malay system of governance. It is 
from this prosperity that Patani’s cultural achievements were 
gained such as in the realm of knowledge and language among 
others.” (A. Malek 1994: 14) 
This understanding of Patani’s history is well-documented in Malay-
language sources as noted above. But, how much detail do the Malays of 
southern Thailand actually remember about their community’s past in their 
everyday discourses? 
“Patani” in Malay Memories 
There was a question that always plagued my mind whenever I pass 
the directional signboard, while traveling along the Pattani-Narathiwat 
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highway, which points to “Phaya Inthira Cemetery”; who was Phaya Inthira? 
Non-Malay names that appear on signboards along this highway are quite a 
rarity. I found out later that Phaya Inthira was also known as Sultan Ismail 
Syah, the first ruler of Patani who converted to Islam. (Syukri 2005) Thus, 
“Phaya Inthira Cemetery” is also known as “Makam Sultan Ismail Syah” by 
the Malays. 
Makam Sultan Ismail Syah is located in Ban Pare in Amphoe Muang, 
Pattani province. At the entrance to the cemetery, one is greeted with a 
signboard that provides the visitor with brief information on Phaya Inthira. 
The information signboard at the cemetery states in English that “Phaya 
Inthira, otherwise known as Sultan Ismail Syah, was the first governor50 of 
Pattani to have changed his belief to Islam. He ruled the province during 1500 
- 1530 AD.” 
After reading the signboard, Bang Ae and I approached an elderly man 
who had just exited the nearby mosque. After Bang Ae and I introduced 
ourselves, the man introduced himself as Khruu Ding51. I told Khruu Ding that 
I was doing research on historical graves in southern Thailand. Khruu Ding 
managed a smile on hearing about my research topic and told me that I had 
come to the right place as the tombs of several rulers of Patani was located at 
several locations within Ban Pare. He, then, began to relate the story of 
                                                          
50 Several English-speaking members of the Malay community whom I spoke to disagreed 
with the identification of Sultan Ismail Syah as a “governor”. They claim that he was actually 
a sovereign ruler and not an official of the Siamese court.  
51 “Khruu” means “teacher” in Thai-language. 
92 
 
Sultan Ismail Syah’s conversion to Islam. His narration of the story; it was 
strikingly similar to Ibrahim Syukri’s (2005) account of the same event. 
Interestingly, Khruu Ding then told me that he knew very little about Patani’s 
history while he was still working as a teacher; even though he taught history 
at a secondary school. He only found out more about Patani’s history from 
reading books after he retired from the teaching profession. He said that 
Malays in southern Thailand tend to know little of their community’s history. 
He attributed this to a lack of exposure of regional history in Thailand’s 
education system. He asserted that students are more likely to know more 
about “Bangkok’s history”52 than their own. 
Khruu Ding advised me to visit the tombs of the female rajas of Patani 
located within the same village. While visiting the other tombs, I approached 
some youths who were sitting at the wakaf53. They were able to point out the 
tombs and provide the names of the different female rajas. They claim that 
the tombs of these rajas were pointed out to them by the older members of 
their village community. None of them, however, were able to relate any 
historical account or stories about the rajas. They said that they were told by 
the older people in their village that these rajas had once ruled Patani. The 
lack of historical knowledge amongst these youths matches what Khruu Ding 
                                                          
52 It is quite common for Malays in southern Thailand to refer to Thailand’s nationalist 
version of the nation-state’s history as “sejarah Bangkok” or “Bangkok’s history”. Some 
Malays told me that “Bangkok’s history” is a “big lie” or “bohong besar” that was created to 
justify the Bangkok-dynasty’s rule. This issue will be discussed later in this chapter. 
53 A hut, which is often used as a resting area, for visitors of cemeteries in the three Muslim 
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. 
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had remarked earlier. Nevertheless, the tombs of Sultan Ismail and the 
succeeding female rajas from his lineage go down as sites of remembrance of 
the historical kingdom of Patani. To the present-day community, these tombs 
are links to their past. Although they know little of their past, what is clear to 
them is that Patani was an independent Malay-Muslim kingdom and had 
been ruled by their own sovereign rulers. 
This lack of intimate knowledge about the history of the Kingdom of 
Patani, from which the present-day Malay population of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, claims origin, is common amongst members of the Malay 
community. Most Malays whom I have met since my first visit to southern 
Thailand in 2002 are able to identify the Kingdom of Patani as a glorious 
independent kingdom in history and was economically prosperous, as Bang 
Ae had implied during our conversation at the coffee-shop. 
Ayah Leh suggests that the Malays’ lack of detailed knowledge in 
regards to their community’s history is the consequence of an absence of 
reading culture amongst them; Bang Ae, however, thinks that the issue of the 
lack of reading culture amongst the Malays must be elaborated. He concurs 
that the Malays of southern Thailand generally do not take to books too 
easily; however, he says that it is important to acknowledge the dearth of 
literature on the history of the Malays in southern Thailand. Furthermore the 
literature on this subject matter is generally unavailable in the three 
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. 
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Wan Soh claims that, in the 1970s, many Malays throughout southern 
Thailand burnt their personal collection of historical literature about their 
own community. He said that the Thai military personnel, then, would 
conduct raids in people’s houses to see if they kept such literature; he claims 
that literature on the history of the Malays of southern Thailand was 
considered seditious. According to him, these raids were carried out more 
frequently following the “Patani Demonstration’ of December 1975. 
Members of the Malay community who possess knowledge of their 
community’s history could not share their knowledge freely in public in the 
past; especially during periods of heightened Malay armed resistance such as 
the 1970s and 1980s. Doing so may make them vulnerable to persecution by 
the Thai-state. I was told by some Malays that male teachers had to be 
particularly careful as they were more vulnerable to accusations of harboring 
separatist intentions by security personnel. 
Thus, circumstances in the political and security environment in 
southern Thailand were vital in contributing to a lack of knowledge amongst 
the Malays of southern Thailand in regards to their community’s past. 
However, certain changes in Thailand’s political environment have enabled 
the issue of the history of its Malay population to be discussed more publicly. 
As democracy began to take root following the withdrawal of the military 
government in 1992, space for the discussion of regional histories such as 
that of the Malay-dominated provinces in southern Thailand grew. According 
to Bang Ae and Bang Mat, several Malay intellectuals were able to deliver 
95 
 
speeches about their community’s history in villages around the three 
provinces following the change from military-rule to civilian-rule.  
Some Malays, however, told me that public speeches about the 
history of the Kingdom of Patani are no longer carried out in villages in the 
current political climate. Even though they alleged that the objective of these 
speeches is to preserve local understanding of their community’s past, they 
claim that the risk for the speakers to be accused of trying to incite the 
Malays to demand independence from Thailand is too great. Likewise, many 
Malays are nervous about keeping literature on the subject in their personal 
possession. Bang Ae requested for me to keep several of his books such as a 
copy of the Hikayat Patani. According to Bang Ae, it would be easy for me to 
justify my possession of the book as I could claim that I was using it for 
academic research purposes. Although I thought, at that time, that that 
reasoning would not help if I was indeed caught with a possession of the 
book, I agreed to Bang Ae’s request as I felt obliged to lighten the stress that 
he was already undergoing as a result of fear generated by the daily 
occurrence of violence in southern Thailand. 
So, the lack of available literature and the sparse public space for 
historical discussion contribute to the tenuousness of the contemporary 
Malay community’s knowledge of their history; but, some people seem to 
know the history of their own village communities more intimately. 
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The first cemetery that I visited in southern Thailand was Kubo Datok; 
this cemetery is located in Ban Dato, which is located in Yaring-district of 
Pattani province. Kubo Datok hosts several keramat, of which the grave of 
Tok Panjang is most renowned. I was amused by the village’s Tok Imam’s54 
recounting of the events surrounding Tok Panjang’s passing. 
According to the the Tok Imam, the establishment of the cemetery at 
Ban Dato was due to an event that took place during the reign of Raja Biru 
between 1616AD-1624AD (Teeuw and Wyatt 1970) Upon her ascension to 
the throne, Raja Biru concentrated on the fortification of Patani’s armory in 
order to preserve Patani’s independence; Siam had begun showing its 
interest to invade Patani with an attack in 1603. Raja Biru, thus, issued an 
embargo against the trade of brass. This material was intended to be used for 
the construction of canons that would fortify Patani’s defense against Siam’s 
offensives. 
There was a trader of Arab descent by the name of Syeikh Gombak 
who was trading in Patani at that time. According to the Tok Imam, Syeikh 
Gombak was unaware of the embargo and continued to trade his supply of 
brass. On one unfortunate night, guards who were patrolling at the beach 
caught his servant, Abdul Mu’min, who was transporting the brass to its 
buyer. Upon hearing of the incident, Raja Biru sentenced Syeikh Gombak and 
his servant to death. Their corpses were then thrown into Sungai Parit Kedi. 
                                                          
54 Tok Imam is the Islamic religious leader of the community. 
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An incredible incident then took place. The corpses stood vertically instead of 
floating horizontally and started traveling, as if walking, along the river with 
the flooding and ebbing of tide in the river. This incident continued for three 
days after which Raja Biru allowed for the corpses to be transported across 
the bay for burial upon the requests of villagers who had become afraid from 
witnessing the events that had unfolded. 
The corpses of both Syeikh Gombak and his servant lengthen 
themselves as they were about to be buried. This incident earned Syeikh 
Gombak the title of Tok Panjang55. Eventually the two corpses were 
successfully buried side-by-side at the present site. Following that incident, 
the cape, which was formally unpopulated, began to attract residents. The 
livelihood of the fishermen in the new village was prosperous and the 
fishermen believed that this was due to the blessing from God was attained 
with the help of Tok Panjang. 
The story of Tok Panjang that was related by the Tok Imam is very 
close to its account in Hikayat Patani. However in Hikayat Patani, Syeikh 
Gombak’s decision to continue trading in brass had been blamed on his own 
greed or entrepreneurial motives instead of a lack of awareness of the 
embargo on brass trade that had been decreed by Raja Biru. Such 
explanations would not be well accommodated by the Ban Dato community 
whose origin has been linked to the sitting of Syeikh Gombak’s grave. 
                                                          
55 Tok is a shorten version of Datuk, which is an honorary title or a symbol of one’s revered 
status in the past. Panjang means long in Malay. 
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Like monuments, the past is exposed to multiple interpretations and 
revisions. Although the Hikayat Patani has emerged as a leading reference 
source for the history of the Malays of southern Thailand, oral histories may 
transmit different versions of the events that are described in the text; such 
as the recounting of the story of Tok Panjang by the Tok Imam of Ban Dato. 
Bang Mat has an interesting hypothesis about the story of Tok 
Panjang. While traveling in a van to Narathiwat one day, Bang Mat asked for 
my opinion on the narrative on the event. I was surprised by the question; 
sensing that he wanted to comment on the event, I asked him to divulge his 
own thoughts about it. 
Bang Mat thinks that Tok Panjang was actually the victim of slander. 
He told me that Tok Panjang was, in fact, a religious teacher. He added, 
“If we imagine the Malay society at that time, there were 
probably two groups of influential people: members of the 
ruling court and the ulama56. I think that Tok Panjang was a 
very famous ulama with a strong following; thus, the raja felt 
threatened. So, she devised a plan to assassinate him. The 
story of Tok Panjang in the Hikayat Patani was the ploy of the 
ruling court. At that time, the common people cannot resist 
the orders of the ruler. Thus, no one could stop the execution 
of Tok Panjang and his servant. So, what his students did was 
                                                          
56 “Ulama” means “religious scholar”. 
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to relocate their homes close to his grave after they had 
buried him; there is a lot of berkat57 from being close to him.” 
Once again, Bang Mat’s critical treatment of the interpretations of 
past events amazed me; his words are proof that members of society, at least 
in southern Thailand, are not passive in consuming narratives of their 
community’s past that are imposed by both Malay and Thai elites. 
Unfortunately, not all, and perhaps not many people, are as critical as Bang 
Mat is. As Bang Ae puts it, “For many people, knowing that Patani was an 
independent kingdom that was prosperous is good enough; the cemeteries of 
sultans and rajas are the evidences that show the truth about our 
interpretation of the community’s past.” 
“Patani” as Siamese Territory: “Patani” in Thailand’s 
Nationalist History 
In the other strand of historiography, which is rooted in Thailand’s 
nationalist history, the Patani Kingdom is not seen as a sovereign political 
entity, but as a territory of Siam. For example, the term used to refer to the 
ruler of Patani is “governor” and not raja, similar to the information furnished 
on the signboard at Makam Sultan Ismail Syah. (Syamananda 1973: 50) In 
other parts of his book, which is entitled A History of Thailand, Rong 
Syamananda claims that the European traders would seek the permission of 
the ruler of Ayutthaya before trading with Patani. Although he identified 
Patani as a “Thai vassal” at some point (1973: 60), he also treated the refusal 
                                                          
57 “Berkat” means blessings from God. 
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of a Patani raja to send the tributary bunga emas58 to King Prasattong of 
Ayutthaya as a declaration of “independence” (1973: 69). The emphasis of 
the right to make decisions involving Patani by Ayutthaya as well as the 
reference terms used to refer to Patani and its ruler clearly indicates 
Syamananda’s view of Patani as a subordinate of, and even a territory 
belonging to, Ayutthaya. Such works of history are influenced by Thailand’s 
nationalist history which is founded on the writings of Prince Damrong 
Rajanubhab (henceforth, Damrong). Damrong played a pivotal role in 
fashioning Thai national consciousness; especially through the founding of 
Siam’s modern education system as well as the centralization of Siam’s 
bureaucracy. (Sivaraksa 1980) According to him (Rajanubhab 1993), Patani 
had always belonged to Siam. But, why is Patani treated different in 
Thailand’s nationalist history? Is there a history to this history? 
A History of Thailand’s history 
Prior to the modernization of the bureaucracy during the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), Siam’s political structure was loosely organized 
around a tributary system. (Suwannathat-Pian 1988; Winichakul 2004) This 
system is similar to Wolters’s (1999) notion of the mandala political system 
whereby weaker states arrange themselves in the spheres of influence of 
more powerful states. (Suwannathat-Pian 1988; Winichakul 2004; Wolters 
1999) In the case of Siam, weaker neighboring states such as the Malay states 
of Patani and Kedah, which are located within its sphere of influence, were 
                                                          
58 An ornamental tree made from gold and silver. 
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required to pay tribute by submitting the bunga emas. The act of sending the 
customary bunga emas indicates respect and recognition for the military 
strength of the tributary overlord. Traditionally, the tributary states had their 
own bureaucratic institutions and Siam seldom intervened in the governance 
of its tributaries. (Winichakul 2004) Hence, Siam’s tributary states were 
largely independent as long as they continued sending the bunga emas 
consistently. In fact, whenever the power of the ruler of Siam weakened, its 
tributaries, especially the Malay kingdoms, would exploit the situation by 
stopping the practice of submitting the bunga emas, refuse to supply troops 
upon the request of the Siamese king, or even switch to another overlord. 
Sometimes, a smaller kingdom may even pay tribute to two overlords. 
(Suwannathat-Pian 1988; Syukri 2005; Teeuw and Wyatt 1970; Winichakul 
2004) Such was the nature of the mandala system of power in pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia. Each mandala would expand and contract in conjunction with 
the increase and decrease in the power of the ruler of the kingdom at the 
center of the mandala. (Wolters 1999) 
The looseness of the power arrangement between Siam and its 
tributaries cannot be understated. In fact, this issue is at the center of the 
contention between traditional Malay and Thai-nationalist interpretation of 
the nature of Patani’s relationship with Siam; was Patani an independent 
nation or a territory of Siam? 
In Thongchai Winichakul’s book entitled “Siam Mapped: A History of 
the Geo-Body of a Nation” (2004), he showed that the territorial conception 
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of Siam is a modern development. He did this through an intimate study of 
the history of mapping in Thailand where he traced the changes in mapping 
techniques and technology employed by the Thais over time. Prior to the 
reign of King Mongkut, the maps of the kingdom did not reflect geological 
reality. However, Mongkut, who was interested in science, caught on to the 
modern technology of map-making. Learning from Siam’s experiences in a 
series of boundary disputes with the British and the French, Mongkut realized 
the importance for Siam to create a modern map of itself that reflects 
physical reality. Cartographic survey missions were, consequently, started 
during Mongkut’s reign and intensified during the succeeding reign of his son, 
Chulalongkorn. 
The quest for the creation of the modern scientific map of Siam was 
not without problems. The establishment of the boundary between Siam and 
French Indochina engendered a lot of disputes between the two nations, 
which culminated in a confrontation between the armed forces of both 
nations in April 1893. (Winichakul 2004; Wyatt 2003) During the event, two 
French gunboats successfully passed through Siam’s fort at Paknam and 
sailed up the Chaophraya River to Bangkok. After successfully establishing the 
naval blockade, the French demanded that Siam acknowledge French rule 
over the whole of Lao territories, east of the Mekong River, as well as some 
territories in Cambodia (Wyatt 2003); humiliated and realizing their own 
vulnerability, Siam conceded. 
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History or Myth? 
According to Anderson, a nation is an “imagined community”; 
“because  the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion” (1991: 6) Yet, what precipitates the 
image of communion that Anderson mentions? 
The gravity of history in the formation of human organizations such as 
nations is well-noted. (Anderson 1991; Gillis 1994b; Hobsbawm and Ranger 
1983; Winichakul 2004) National history is an invented memory that is shared 
and believed by people who may not know, and possibly will never know, one 
another and yet believe that they share a common past. (Gillis 1994b) The 
belief that the nation as a primordial entity has a long history buttresses its 
pursuit, and maintenance, of solidarity amongst its citizens. Thus, the notion 
of a shared past is significant for a nation to perpetuate a commitment to a 
shared future amongst its citizens; without which, the nation will cease to 
exist. 
Following the Crisis of 1893, French and Siamese mapping officials 
were convened with assistance from the British. The result was the 
publication of two maps of Siam in 1897. (Winichakul 2004) The creation of a 
national history, then, became imperative if Siam was to survive this rupture 
in the kingdom’s history. A new narrative had to be created and disseminated 
to peoples who populated its newly created geo-body to create a sense of 
belonging to Siam. 
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The creation of the new history of Siam, and Damrong was 
instrumental in this project, victimized indigenous histories such as the 
traditional Malay interpretation of the Kingdom of Patani. Tributaries of Siam 
at the peripheries, such as Patani, were suddenly treated as natural biological 
components of the nation’s geo-body. The “national myth” (Smith 1991) that 
was successfully produced served the needs of the power holders by 
advocating the continued legitimacy of the ruling elites of Siam. The ruling 
elites could now call upon the “people of Siam”59 to unite in the face of 
foreign threat. 
The inception of a nation-building campaign followed the creation of 
Siam’s geo-body and national history. This fabricated national history was 
then promoted through this campaign in the form of songs, plays, fictions, as 
well as subjects taught in the public education system. (Barme 1993; 
Winichakul 2004) 
The success of Thailand’s nation-building campaign is pronounced. 
Indigenous conceptions of the past have been significantly sidelined. For 
example, the teaching of Thailand’s national history in public schools 
contributes to the lack of intimate knowledge amongst the Malays of 
southern Thailand for their community’s history; as has been described 
earlier. Amongst the non-Malay citizens of Thailand, the following statement 
made by a friend of mine who hails from Chiang Mai is telling of the extent of 
                                                          
59 With the creation of the new national myth, a top-down political exercise imposed the 
grouping of the communities of the various tributaries under one Siamese flag. 
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the influence that Thailand’s national history has on some of its citizens’ 
conception of the nation, 
“Where do all these Malays (in southern Thailand) come from 
anyway? I think we should just send them back. They are so 
ungrateful. It is already good enough that we allow them to 
live on our land!” 
Thus, the strands of historical narrative that members of a society are 
exposed to is pivotal; it affects people’s conception of the nation’s past, what 
the society is in the present and what it should be in the future. It is not 
surprising then that the Malays of southern Thailand are often seen by some 
members of Thai society as outsiders as well as a chronic problem for the 
nation-state; as my friend, and he is not alone in making such statements to 
me, who is quoted above implies. 
After The Defeat: Malay Memories of Collective 
Suffering after Siam’s Invasion of Patani in 1786 
The history of the Malays from southern Thailand is a history of 
rebellions if one adopts the perspective that is informed by Thailand’s 
national history. The view of many Malays of southern Thailand of their 
community’s past after Patani’s defeat to Siam in 1786, however, can be 
described as a history of suffering; a history of “Siamese cruelty”; and 
injustice. This was the impression that I get from engaging with Malays from 
various walks of life in southern Thailand as well as from my readings of 
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Malay historical writings. (A. Malek 1993; A. Malek 1994; Al-Fatani 1994; 
Syukri 2005) 
In the previous chapter, the memorializing efforts of some Malays in 
regards to certain violent clashes between members of their community and 
agents of the Thai-state, which occurred in recent decades, have been 
discussed. Due to the lack of authority to express their interpretations of this 
event very blatantly, monumental graves have been built in order to promote 
their interpretations of these events, which may be seen as subversive by the 
Thai-state. 
Several people I spoke to told me of the Thai-state’s cruel treatment 
of the Malays of southern Thailand. These stories are transmitted orally 
amongst members of the contemporary Malay community in southern 
Thailand; the Malay narrators of these stories often claim that the stories 
were conveyed to them from preceding generations of their community. 
These narratives, which are usually referred to as “kisah sedih” or sad 
events, are a recurrent topic of conversations amongst many Malays of 
southern Thailand. The earliest sad event that is retained in memory is 
associated with the defeat of the Kingdom of Patani by the Siamese around 
1786. The Malays often refer to this event as Musoh Tani60. Interestingly, the 
story was first related to me in Bangkok by a Malay friend from southern 
                                                          
60 Actually, “Musoh Tani” means “Patani War”. In oral accounts, the date of Musoh Tani is 
not clear; sometimes the first defeat of Pattani to Siam in 1786 is referred to as Musoh Tani 
Lama or the “Older Patani War”. Another event that has been labeled as Musoh Tani is a 
rebellion in Patani that took place in 1832 that was successfully quelled by Siam’s soldiers. 
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Thailand who is in his mid-twenties while taking a boat ride along Saen Saeb 
Canal in the city.61 
He told me that many of Siam’s war captives at that time62, including 
the Malays, were forced to dig the Saen Saeb canal with their bare hands. 
Many Malays in southern Thailand also told me that large earrings were 
pierced into the earlobes of the Malay war captives and subsequently linked 
using poles by Siam’s soldiers. This served as deterrence to anyone who 
planned to escape during the journey from Patani to Bangkok. Other 
accounts told of rattan rods being poked into holes that have been punctured 
through the Malay war captives’ Achilles tendons for the same purpose. I 
cannot ascertain the veracity of these stories, but for many Malays, the 
presence of various Malay residential communities along the Saen Saeb Canal 
is a hint at the credibility of such accounts. Furthermore, “saen saeb” means 
“one hundred thousand stinging pain”; therefore linking the canal with 
memories of tremendous pain and suffering. 
So far allegations of Siamese cruelty that have been described in this 
thesis are limited to the physical harming of the Malays by agents of the Thai-
                                                          
61 Saen Saeb Canal is one of the major canals in Bangkok water-based public transportation 
network. Saen Saeb means “extreme pain”. 
62 It has been mentioned in an earlier footnote that there is often confusion over the dates of 
the sad events or kisah-kisah sedih. The construction of the Saen Saeb Canal began in 1837; 
thus, it is highly likely that the relevant Musoh Tani was the Malay rebellion that occurred in 
1832. See 
Tanabe, Shigeharu 
1977 Historical Geography of the Canal System in the Chao Phraya Delta. Journal of the 
Siam Society 65(2):23-72. 
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state. Some Malays of southern Thailand, however, claim that the injustices 
that they have been subjected to by agents of the Thai-state extend beyond 
physical violence. 
According to Bang Ae, he and Bang Mat had attended a vocational 
course by the Thai army. He claims that interaction between the instructors, 
who were soldiers, and the trainees, some of whom are Malays, went very 
well until the closing ceremony. At this ceremony, the trainees were 
presented with medals by a senior army officer. Bang Ae described the 
ceremony: 
“They placed a framed picture of the King on a table. They told 
us to bow to the picture and then the officer would place the 
medal around our necks. We, the Malays, refused to do that. 
The soldiers then got angry and accused us of being disloyal to 
the King as well as Thailand. The atmosphere was very tense. 
We (the Malays) decided to call some ulama to explain to the 
soldiers that Muslims cannot bow to objects as it is against the 
religion; it is tantamount to idol worship. The ulamas came 
and tried to explain this to the officer, but they insisted that 
we followed their orders or we won’t be given the medals. In 
the end, we decided not to take the medals. After all, we 




The incident showed the intricacies of inter-faith relations in Thailand. 
Bang Ae concedes that not all Thais who are non-Buddhists are as 
uncompromising, in regards to religious differences, as the soldiers involved 
in the incident. Nonetheless, he thinks that the incident showed how 
convenient it is for the Malays of southern Thailand to be accused of 
disloyalty to the Thai nation-state and its king. Bang Ae asks, “Why can’t we 
just respect one another’s religious beliefs?” It is likely that the perception of 
the propensity of the Malays of southern Thailand to rebel against the Thai 
nation-state is ingrained amongst Thailand’s security officers who are 
entrusted with the duty to protect the sovereignty of the nation-state and its 
key institutions such as the monarchy. 
Fear, Memory, Identity, and Resistance 
“Life in southern Thailand is not ideal, but we can survive here; 
it is livable. Generally, we can continue doing the things that 
we like, and avoid the things that we don’t like. But, 
sometimes they (the Thai government and its security forces) 
make it difficult for us to live here; as if they don’t want us. 
That’s the problem.” – Bang Tah 
It has been stated in chapter one that most Malays of southern 
Thailand choose to remain as non-partisans in the on-going armed conflict 
that has claimed thousands of lives. According to Bang Tah, the living 
conditions for the Malays in southern Thailand are manageable despite the 
complaints that they have. He asserts that the Malays are not the only ones 
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who have complaints about life in Thailand; “Everyone complains”, says Bang 
Tah. In saying that “sometimes they make it difficult for us to live here” Bang 
Tah was referring to the attitudes that are displayed and actions that are 
taken by the government as well as Thailand’s security forces in their 
handling of the on-going violence. He says that the deep distrust that the 
state has for the Malays is hurting. Bang Ae and Bang Mat think that it is 
unfair for the majority of the Malays to bear the brunt of the suspicion of the 
Thai nation-state just because of a few militant members. “How are we 
supposed to live like this? Because of their tactics, our relationships with our 
fellow villagers are affected!” said Bang Ae in reference to the surveillance 
policies of the Thai-state that has been described earlier. 
This thesis has shown that the non-partisanship of many Malays of 
southern Thailand in the armed conflict in that region of the country must 
not be taken to indicate political passivity. These Malays engage in resistance 
against the insurgents as well as the Thai-state. It is important to note that 
the mounting of resistance is not predicated only on values such as bravery; 
fear is also instrumental in determining a person or group’s decision to resist 
those who attempt to govern their actions. Thus, resistance involves the 
adoption of calculated risks. 
In chapter one, the resolve of many Malays against taking sides with 
the insurgents as well as the Thai-state, is interpreted as their resistance 
against the domineering political ambitions of either party in the conflict. In 
the process, they have in fact adopted a third position; that is to defend their 
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right to a peaceful life. These Malays have exercised agency in their 
resistance against the agendas of the conflicting parties despite the climate 
of fear that envelopes their socio-political environment, which in turn is the 
intended consequence of the panoptic surveillance strategies of the 
insurgents and the Thai-state. 
Fear of punishment from the Thai-state also shapes the modes of 
resistance that is adopted, as well as the issues that are taken up in 
resistance, by some Malays of southern Thailand. Many Malays are aware 
that resisting the Thai-state through participation in the armed resistance 
may bring about grievous repercussions; the deaths of more than one 
hundred alleged militants at the behest of Thailand’s security forces on 28 
April 2004 is one extreme example. Many Malays’ refusal to join the armed 
resistance movements is, thus, a pragmatic choice as many of them believe 
that the insurgents are fighting a losing battle because they cannot match the 
strength of the Thai security forces’ firepower as well as manpower. 
Some Malays resist the Thai-state’s interpretations of certain aspects 
of their community’s history; especially the history of relations between 
them and the Thai nation-state. The construction of “tombs of martyrs” as 
monuments of Malay resistance against the Thai-state has been discussed. 
These tombs elevate the social standing of these slain men to community 
heroes; martyrs who sacrificed their lives in their struggle for their 
community to be treated with justice. It is likely that these individuals would 
be remembered as trouble-makers if the production of memories of the 
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events associated with their deaths is left solely the prerogative of the Thai-
state. Yet, it is possible that the Thai-state is aware of the existence of these 
monumental tombs of martyrs. It appears as if the Thai-state is willing to 
tolerate the honoring of these “trouble-makers” as through these tombs as 
long as they remain largely inconspicuous. I have often been told by some 
members of the Malay community that these tombs are not meant to incite 
separatist sentiments amongst members of their community, but simply to 
serve as a site of memory. 
The intensity of Malay resistance against the Thai-state’s domination 
over historical production, however, increases and abates in relation to 
changes in the socio-political conditions surrounding the relations between 
the Thai nation-state and their Malay population. For example, public 
speeches regarding these issues were delivered by Malay intellectuals during 
the 1990s when democracy was beginning to take root in Thailand after the 
re-introduction of civilian governance in 1992. The on-going violence, 
however, has resulted in lesser opportunities for such speeches to be made 
in public. This does not mean that members of the Malay community in 
southern Thailand have stopped discussing their own interpretation of 
incidences of violence. The construction of the tombs of martyrs of 28 April 
2004 in Jaha and Sebayo ratifies this view. 
It has also been argued that historical narratives influence people’s 
conceptions of their society in the present-day and what their society should 
be in the future. For people who are exposed solely to Thai-nationalist 
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historical accounts, the Malays of southern Thailand are likely to be viewed 
as a disloyal group of people who always rebel against the Thai nation-state; 
in other words, they are a consistent source of problems for others in Thai 
society. 
For some Malays, the existence of the tombs of sultans and rajas of 
Patani evinces the history of their community as an independent kingdom. 
Narratives of the cruel acts of the Siamese on members of the community 
since the first defeat of Patani to Siam in 1786 to the present-day stirs up 
anti-state emotions amongst some Malays. Thus, while some Malays take up 
arms against the Thai-state, others resist the Thai-state’s nationalist 
interpretation of history by disseminating oral historical accounts of a history 
of the glories of the historical Kingdom of Patani. These oral accounts are 
transmitted to other members of the contemporary, as well as across 
generations of, Malay population of southern Thailand. 
The link between memory and group identity is a consequential one. 
(Anderson 1991; Barme 1993; Gillis 1994a; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; 
Lowenthal 1994; Smith 1991; Winichakul 2004) Traditional Malay accounts of 
their community’s past enhances their community’s resolve to preserve a 
Malay ethnic identity that emphasizes cultural differences between them and 
other groups that make up the Thai nation-state. Memories of their collective 
suffering as a community at the hands of agents of the Thai-state become 
instrumental in creating unity. I have often been informed by members of the 
Malay community of southern Thailand that they believe that it is important 
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for them to maintain their ethnic identity. When asked why it is important to 
maintain their ethnic identity, many Malays are unable to furnish a reason 
except to avoid being completely assimilated into the Thai culture; although 
it is also important not to assume that the Malays of southern Thailand 
preserve their ethnic identity for the sole purpose of resisting the Thai-state’s 
nation-building campaign. Bang Ae and I once accompanied Ayah Leh on a 
visit to a Malay community on Libong Island, which is located on the southern 
Thailand’s west-coast province of Trang. Reflecting on the community that 
we visited, Bang Ae said, 
“It is so sad that they have lost their customs and traditions. 
They are very certain that they are ethnically Malays, yet they 
cannot speak a single word of the Malay-language. Even the 
older villagers who claim that they used to speak in Malay 
during their childhood can no longer do that. I never thought 
that this was possible. Now, they are no different from any 
other Thai-person. That’s why we have to preserve our culture 
in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Furthermore, our culture is 
wealth that we have inherited from our ancestors. It will be a 
waste if we stop practicing it.” 
It is important, however, to bear in mind that the Malays of southern 
Thailand are not a monolithic group. Collective memories of community 
histories as well as events have been shown to be detached from the lived 
experiences of individuals involved; hence, they tend to be facile. It is thus 
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important to seek alternative voices of the individual members of society, 
and in this case the Malay community, to gain a more thorough 
understanding of the community being studied. Bang Mat’s alternative 
interpretations of certain events have enabled a more varied perspective of 
the Malay community of southern Thailand to be furnished in this thesis. His 
views are proof that individuals may exercise agency in interpreting the 
politics that surrounds them; although the relative strong influence of group 
narratives cannot be ignored. 
Conclusion: Anti-State, but not Separatists 
Several Malay residents of southern Thailand told me that they hope 
that the violence that has wrecked their socio-political environment would 
end soon. Many of them add that rather than fight for an independent Malay 
nation-state, they would rather channel their efforts towards creating a 
brighter future for their youth. Bang Ae, in particular, commands some 
respect from other members of his village community; although his family 
counts among the more necessitous families in Ban Keli, Bang Ae’s children 
are excelling in their studies. His eldest child is now an undergraduate, while 
his second child is set to follow suit. Envious neighbors often ask Bang Ae on 
how he has managed to motivate his children to succeed in education. 
Furthermore, other villagers admire Bang Ae’s economic sacrifice; they told 
me that Bang Ae remains poor in part because he spends most of his money 
to school his children. In general, some residents of Ban Keli take pride in the 
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positive trend in the number of their village youth who earn placements in 
universities. 
The ambition of many Malays to achieve success in various aspects of 
public life in Thailand is testament to their loyal commitment to that nation-
state. I was told by several Malays that a career in the civil service is a dream 
held by many young Malay university graduates; I know several such 
aspirants personally. Even the active participation of some Malays in protests 
that are organized by non-governmental organizations, such as those against 
environmental issues, ratify this commitment. This, of course, does not 
obliterate the fact that it is possible for someone to partake in Thailand’s 
public life and yet harbor separatist sentiments. Thus, it is important to adopt 
a nuanced view of these issues and be critical of the simplistic rhetoric that 
the Thai-state and the Malay insurgents engage in from time to time. 
The anti-state resistance of southern Thailand’s Malay community, 
such as the erection of monumental tombs of martyrs as well as the 
dissemination of oral histories that challenge the official narrative of 
Thailand’s history, do not signify Malay inclination to establish a separate 
Malay nation-state from Thailand. Instead, they indicate the desire of some 
Malays for a less discriminatory notion of “Thainess”63; both in rhetoric as 
well as practice. Thus, in the classic-fashion whereby the ethnographic 
subject speaks to the ethnographer using examples that the ethnographer 
                                                          
63 “Thainess” is often referred to as “khwaam pen thai”. 
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can relate to, Bang Ae said to me, “We are Thai citizens, but ethnically Malay. 
If people of various ethnicities can co-exist peacefully in Singapore, why 




ON THE NEED TO COMBAT ESSENTIALISM 
 
It was another hot afternoon in southern Thailand. Bang Ae and I sat 
at a coffee-shop in Ban Ketam and gulped down glasses of refrigerated soft 
drinks as we took a break from building a garage at Ayah Leh’s house. Then, a 
military truck stopped outside the coffee-shop and three soldiers alighted 
promptly. They walked towards the roadside snack stall where one of them 
purchased some finger food while the other two stood guard. Then, Bang Ae 
said to me, 
“I sympathize with these guys; the soldiers. Even when buying 
food, they have to be so vigilant. I would also be afraid if I 
were a soldier in southern Thailand. They come from other 
provinces; they have no friends here; and they know nothing 
of this place except that there is a lot of violence and that 
many civil servants have been killed, including soldiers. Their 
uniforms are supposed to give them authority. But here, their 
uniforms make them targets. It makes them easily seen by the 
killers. I really pity them; and their family. There are rumors 
saying that some soldiers are even willing to pay others to 
come to southern Thailand in their place.” 
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For me, Bang Ae’s words were encouraging. Essentialism and 
prejudice are so rife in many societies, yet there are those amongst us who 
are sensible enough to reject them. In southern Thailand, the Thai military is 
often viewed by some Malays as a violent organization; it embodies the Thai-
state’s violence towards the Malay community. As one Malay man put it, 
“How can they send the military to build peace in southern 
Thailand? That’s not the function of the Thai military. They are 
trained to kill and that’s all that they can do. Just look at the 
way they handled that group (the militants) at Krisek Mosque 
on 28 April (2004) and the crowd at Tak Bai.”  
Ayah Leh concurs when he told me, 
“An old friend of mine called me to ask for advice. He said that 
in his long service in the military, this is the first time that he is 
tasked with peace-building. He said that he has fought the 
communists in Isan64; killed them. But, this (peace-building) is 
more difficult to carry out than that. He just did not know 
what to do. Sometimes I wonder; how can killing a fellow 
human being be easier to do than to ‘make friends’?” 
Once I accompanied Bang Ae to visit his friend at Ban Belut, a village 
that is adjacent to Ban Keli. While the three of us sat down and talked in the 
hall of his home, a section of soldiers on foot beat walked by his house; one 
                                                          
64 Isan is the colloquial term referring to the Northeastern region of Thailand. 
120 
 
of the soldiers was carrying a general purpose machine-gun (GPMG), a 
relatively large rifle. Bang Ae’s friend, Mat Seng, shook his head and said, 
“Look at those guys. They walk by several times every day. They don’t talk to 
the villagers; they don’t smile. Instead, they just look at us suspiciously. How 
can they establish good rapport with the villagers that way? Sometimes I feel 
like we are living in Iraq!” 
 Incidents such as the “Tragedy of 13 December 1975” and those that 
occurred on 28 April 2004 and 25 October 2004 do little to challenge the 
perceived cruelties of the Thai-state and the military amongst the Malays. 
The intensity of the force employed by the state through its military during 
these events is perceived to be excessive by many Malays. For some Malays, 
the use of grenades and rocket launchers apart from the usual assault rifles 
testifies to the Thai-military’s high propensity for violence. That some of the 
militants who sought refuge inside Krisek Mosque on 28 April 2004 were 
killed at point-blank is taken by some Malays as an indication of the 
inhumanness of the military. 
Some Malays, like Bang Ae, on the other hand, differentiate between 
the military as an organization and the individual soldiers that c0nstitute the 
military. By sympathizing with the soldiers and their families, Bang Ae treats 
the soldier as a fellow person; instead of viewing him simplistically as just 
another member of the military. Further, he puts himself in the shoes of the 
soldier when he added, “I would not want to trade places with the soldiers. 
Walking around to protect others, when you cannot even protect yourself? It 
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must be very stressful.” Ayah Leh adds, “Usually you’ll be more afraid if you 
are standing in public with a weapon on you. You will worry about whether 
someone will snatch your weapon and use it to harm you.”65 It is such a 
contradiction; the soldier’s source of authority, such as his firearms and 
uniform, is also a potential source of harm for him. 
I had the opportunity to talk with a Muslim army captain from 
Bangkok who has been posted to southern Thailand since 2004. He told me 
about his experience of being spot-checked at a military roadblock once while 
riding his motorcycle back to camp after performing prayers at a nearby 
mosque. At that time, he was dressed in jubah66 and spotted a skullcap on his 
head. According to him, the soldiers who checked him were quite rude until 
he divulged his real identity to them. He, then, advised them to treat the local 
residents more appropriately; he thinks that it is important for soldiers to 
treat the locals with respect in order to gain their trust. He said that he told 
them, “Not all Malays are insurgents. So, you shouldn’t treat all of them as if 
                                                          
65 In Singapore, all men, with a few exceptions, are expected to enlist for national service at 
the age of eighteen. Thus, I could immediately relate to Ayah Leh’s comment due to my 
national service experience. I was assigned to the Police Coast Guard. We were constantly 
reminded to be vigilant in guarding our personal weapons from being snatched. Many of us 
would feel relieved when at the end of every patrol shift when we return our firearms to the 
armory. 
66 The jubah is a long gown, similar to a cassock, which is commonly worn by Malay-Muslim 
men in southern Thailand when they perform prayers at the mosque. The jubah is originally 
traditional Arab clothing for men. 
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they are. Do not judge people by their dressing, or simply by their darker skin 
color67.” 
It has been argued in this thesis that there are two dominant strands 
of discourse on the relations between the Malays of southern Thailand and 
the Thai nation-state. The dominant Malay discourse about the issue asserts 
that the Thai-state, especially through its military, is violent and cruel 
towards the Malays of southern Thailand. On the other hand, the dominant 
discourse of the Thai-state contends that the Malays of southern Thailand are 
troublemakers who consistently challenge the sovereignty of the Thai nation-
state through armed separatist movements. These two influential discourses, 
which are parochial and antithetical to each other, are a major obstacle to 
the establishment of peace in southern Thailand.  
Individuals like Bang Ae, the army captain, as well as Bang Mat who 
was mentioned in the earlier chapters, are proofs that individual members of 
communities exercise agency in rationalizing these two discursive 
frameworks. It is important to encourage others in Thai society, in specific, 
and the world, in general, to adopt such critical positions. If essentialism 
remains pandemic in society, it is likely that many people will be alienated. 
For example, should my encounter with the taxi driver in Phuket, which was 
discussed in chapter three, occur to the members of the Malay community of 
                                                          
67 Some Thais view the Malays as having darker skin, or tua dam, compared to them. 
Personally, I have been treated both with much politeness by some soldiers, and rudely by 
others; both before and after they have learnt of my identity as a Singaporean. 
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Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, it is imaginable that they would feel even more 
alienated from the rest of Thai society. 
The effect of such essentialism is greater when it involves the actions 
of influential institutions such as the state. The Thai-state provides weapons 
and firearms training to Thai-Buddhist villages in Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, as a response to the on-going violence, which is consistently 
blamed on the “Muslims”68. In doing so, the state sends a message to Thai-
Buddhists in southern Thailand that they have to be wary of the Muslims 
around them; as the identity of individual insurgents are not known. Some 
Malay-Muslims, on the other hand, feel that the Thai-state has acted unfairly. 
Bang Ae said to me, “Many Malays are disappointed in the government for 
providing firearms and training to the Buddhists. When we look carefully at 
the trend of the killings, we Malays are just as vulnerable as the Buddhists.” 
Hence, the Thai-state’s decision to provide arms and training to Thai-
Buddhists in southern Thailand has fuelled feelings of hatred and distrust 
between the two ethno-religious communities. Some Malay men told me 
that many of their Thai-Buddhists friends have distanced themselves since 
the start of the on-going violence. At present, the military even acknowledges 
the possibility that Thai-Buddhist vigilante groups, some founded by Thai 
security officers and even with the support of the queen, may be involved in 
                                                          




several extra-judicial killings of Muslims in southern Thailand. (C. Pinyorat 
2007a)  
The constant reference to the Malays of southern Thailand as 
“Muslims” by the Thai-state and the mass media has created a widespread 
perception that the violence in southern Thailand is, in fact, a religious 
conflict. In the context of current geo-political trends, with much focus on 
Muslim terrorism in other parts of the world, the “Muslim” label lends the 
Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand susceptible to be misunderstood as 
another community of Muslim terrorists. This trend can be observed on the 
Internet where articles about “Muslim militants” published in Thailand’s 
English-language newspapers are uploaded onto online blogs. (Johnson 2007)  
Such information, in turn, buttresses the misconceptions that many people 
have about Muslims the world over. Someone in Bangkok once said to me, 
“Why do you choose to do your work in the South? The Muslims will kill you. 
They will cut off your head.” 
Thus, the consequences of essentialism are extensive; especially in an 
increasingly globalized world where information about one society is received 
by others across the world in a matter of seconds. This thesis highlights the 
importance of agency in human thought and action. In the case of the 
violence in southern Thailand, it is important for the Thai-state as well as the 
Thai society to avoid believing and propagating essentialist dominant views of 
the Malays as disloyal troublemakers. The reverse is also pertinent; the 
Malays of southern Thailand should not adopt a view of the Thai-state that is 
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based solely on the episodes of violence in the history of relations between 
them. 
In a wider context, the violence involving the Malay-Muslims of 
southern Thailand must not be simplistically taken as another religious 
conflict and that the insurgents are merely another group of Islamic 
terrorists. By assuming that the violence in southern Thailand as religious 
conflict, the Thai-state as well as writers, including academics and journalists, 
have contributed to the creation of an international image of the Malay 
insurgents as Islamic terrorists. This, in turn, incites more suspicion for the 
world’s Muslims population. 
Given the immeasurable adverse impacts of essentialism, it is 
imperative for scholars to recognize the existence of individual agency when 
studying social issues. Presenting dominant discourses, even if they are 
antithetical, is not enough if we are to contribute anything to the betterment 
of the human condition. 
“Normally others don’t see us; the small people. Even when 
they do, they only see our heads. They don’t see our faces. 
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